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This Working Paper has been edited by a group of present and former 
EUI research students who all work in the field of European private law. 
The formation of this group was furthered by two seminars on the Euro­
peanisation process which we held jointly over a number of years and 
‘formalised’ following a conference on ‘Private Law Adjudication in the 
European Multi-Level-System’ on 2-3 October 1998 at the EUI. The 
editing of the contributions to that conference was, and continues to be, 
at the centre of the group’s activities. But during the editing process the 
group again and again evolved into a deliberative forum in which ever 
new dimensions of the Europeanisation problem became apparent and 
inspired lively debates. We are quite confident that these co-operative 
efforts have very productive side effects for individual research projects. 
The ‘Working Group on the Europeanisation of Private Law’ will soon 
establish a website of its own and hopefully forge new links with its 
European environment.
Florence, July 1999
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The complex and multi-faceted issue of harmonisation of private law 
may be said to constitute one of the most intriguing legal challenges 
within the European Union. In line with Articles 3(h), 94, 95 (ex Arts. 
100, 100a) EC Treaty according to which the Community is (only) 
competent to act in respect of ‘the approximation of the laws of Member 
States to the extent required for the functioning of the common market’, 
its activities have until now been confined to selective and rather nar­
rowly focused legislative interventions, pursuing specific economic or 
social objectives in the overall process of market integration. Well- 
known examples include the EC directives on commercial agents, prod­
uct liability, doorstep-selling, consumer credit, package holidays and 
tours, unfair terms in consumer contracts, time sharing, and, most re­
cently, delay in payment and consumer guarantees in sales. However, as 
is becoming increasingly apparent, the beneficial, market-promoting in­
fluence of this piecemeal legislation is often relatively limited, whilst its 
disintegrative effects —  owing to the partial overlapping of national le­
gal systems by potentially conflicting fragmented supra- and interna­
tional sources —  frequently become hardly manageable.
Against this background, many private law scholars, inspired by suc­
cessful national codification experiences, have long called for a more 
comprehensive harmonisation of core areas of private law such as con­
tract and tort. Following this line of reasoning, the case for a European 
Civil Code is powerfully sustained in this collection’s first contribution 




























































































endowed with a common legal infrastructure of private law, since the 
existing variety of contract laws in Europe could be regarded as a non­
tariff barrier to trade. The arguments of legal certainty, calculability of 
transactions and the protection of foreigners famously advanced by 
Anton F. J. Thibaut in 1814 in favour of codification are alleged to be 
equally valid in present times. Accordingly, the ‘Principles of European 
Contract Law’ —  the well-known compilation of European contract law 
elaborated by a multi-national team of leading scholars under the aegis 
of Professor Lando —  should be understood as a preliminary step to­
wards codification.
However, as shown in Kristina Preinerstorfer 's comment, private law 
harmonisation might hide more complex features. At the outset, this 
contribution argues that the social and economic conditions which made 
possible the 19th century formal law codifications are to a large extent 
no longer present. As a component of the emerging European multi­
level polity, private law is obliged to accommodate the regulatory mar­
ket-related interventions of European economic legislation. Moreover, 
in the wake of the globalisation of the economy, national codifications 
have been superseded by new categories of standard and mass contracts, 
as well as by a layer of autonomous transnational law created by the 
business community (often denominated Tex mercatoria’) which tends 
to disregard the nation state’s constitutional, institutional and regulatory 
limitations. Therefore, Kristina Preinerstorfer concludes that codifica­
tion may be too ambitious an enterprise, and that the Lando principles 
should rather remain an optional regime at the disposal of the parties to 




























































































logue, these principles may become valuable tools for co-ordination 
among the fragmented European directives, international uniform law 
and the remaining body of national private law.
Mauro Bussani's article presents the Trento ‘Common Core Project’ 
whose main goal lies in the drafting of a detailed comparative ‘map’ of 
Europe’s private laws, without however wishing to push towards uni­
formity. As regards codification efforts, Professor Bussani raises objec­
tions on the grounds that, while being part of the European multi-level 
system, each national legal system is at the same time also characterised 
by an internal stratification of different socio-culturally determined lay­
ers. The bottom layers are constituted by ethical values, as evidenced in 
bonds of personal authority (e.g. family and kinsfolk relations) as well 
as by customary rules such as neighbourhood relationships (rarely re­
solved by means of formal adjudication). However, with the topmost 
layer being constituted by international commerce which is dominated 
by self-adjudication, there would appear to exist only one intermediary 
‘ordinary formal layer’. Only there is resort usually had to legal adjudi­
cation and, consequently, can harmonisation reasonably take place. 
However, in that layer too, harmonisation would depend on the prior 
development of a common legal culture, a culture which would need to 
be instilled in the future class of interpreters of the new rules of a Euro­
pean codification.
The gradual establishment of a common legal culture is also the pre­
dominant concern of the forthcoming series of ‘lus Commune Case­
books for the Common Law of Europe’ whose underlying rationale is 




























































































Larouche. This project, which was begun in 1994 by former Advocate 
General Walter van Gerven, also pursues a ‘bottom-up’ approach to 
harmonisation, according to which the emergence of a new ius commune 
is to be fostered through a common legal education. To realise this ob­
jective, the forthcoming casebooks (the first volume of which, on the 
scope of tort law protection, has already been published) confront Euro­
pean students with the doctrinal basics, different styles and modes of 
reasoning of Europe’s legal systems as well as with authentic cases 
translated into English and dealing with similar-fact situations (e.g. vio­
lations of personality rights). Alongside similar ius commune compila­
tions by Hein Kotz on ‘European Contract Law’ and Christian von Bar 
on ‘The Common European Law of Torts’, this casebook series may in­
deed be considered as an important first step towards the Europeanisa­
tion of legal science and education, as an alternative to legislative har­
monisation.
The review essay at the end of this collection reflects our own views 
on private law harmonisation. We, too, are essentially favourable to 
‘bottom-up’ harmonisation as advocated by the ius commune projects. 
Although we would not go as far as to definitively preclude any future 
codification of European private law, we think that further groundwork 
and preparation is in any case needed at the present stage. This should 
be done with a view to overcoming legal obstacles, such as the current 
restrictive reading of the subsidiarity principle, as well as practical ob­
jections, such as the potential resistance of European lawyers who are 
forced to give up their venerable national codifications. Most impor­




























































































and therefore, it should result from competition among national solu­
tions and doctrinal constructs, to be tested against each other in transna­
tional discursive processes among legal communities.
To prepare the ground for such discourse, we suggest that the existing 
transnational scholarly projects should in a first step be co-ordinated, 
further extended and publicised among European lawyers. This could 
occur through the mechanism of a ‘European Law Institute’ which, fol­
lowing the successful American example, might be jointly established 
by academics and practitioners. Such an Institute might also elaborate 
‘Mosaic-type Restatements’ of various fields of European private law 
which incorporate existing European and international legislation on 
private law as well as the national provisions and doctrinal constructs 
which find most acclaim. These compilations might become the primary 
tools, with the help of which transnational legal discourse could become 
a reality. In the end, we are convinced that, if a European code should 
actually be enacted one day, this should be done with the support and 
the participation of an emerging European legal community, and not 





























































































With the exception of the last, the essays assembled in this volume 
are edited and enhanced versions of contributions to the conference on 
‘Private Law Adjudication in the European Multi-Level-System’, held 
on 2-3 October 1998 at the European University Institute in Florence. 
All of them have been extensively discussed, in part together with the 
authors, by a group of researchers who meet regularly to analyse various 
issues within the Europeanisation process in private law. It is with this 
publication that we wish to address the European legal public for the 
first time. We hope that it stimulates readers’ interests, and we would 
appreciate any comments or critique. Finally, we would like to thank our 
colleague Diamond Ashiagbor for correcting the manuscripts and Pro­
fessors Marie-Jeanne Campana and Christian Joerges for including this 
collection in the EUI Working Paper Series.
Florence, July 1999




























































































Optional or Mandatory Europeanisation of Contract Law
Ole Lando
1 Should contract law be Europeanied?
The term to Europeanise the law, as used here, means to unify or 
harmonise European law, i.e. the law of those countries which are or 
| will become members of the European Union. By optional Europeani- 
sation, I understand a procedure by which it is left to the courts or arbi­
trators to decide whether they will bring the contract laws of Europe 
closer to each other. Mandatory Europeanisation is a unification or har­
monisation which is imposed upon the parties and the courts by the 
Union authorities or by the legislators of the Unions countries.
I shall first address the question of whether an increased européanisa­
tion of contract law is desirable at all, and then how it should be done, in 
the optional or in the mandatory way.
Against a Europeanisation, one could argue, first, that although nei­
ther the Maastricht nor the Amsterdam Treaties prevent the governments 
from agreeing on a Convention on Uniform European contract law, the 
Union treaties do not provide any clear mandate to proceed with the Eu­
ropeanisation of contract law, and certainly not in a mandatory form. 




























































































Second, Europe seems to live without unification of contract law and 
to live well. Why then change the laws? It will cost sweat, money, and 
among many lawyers, even tears. Think of a German lawyer who has 
worked all his life with his Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch; and of the Com­
mon lawyer who cultivates the refined techniques of his law of contracts 
as developed by the courts. Many lawyers will hate to see all that they 
have learned and practised disappear, and they will hate to become law 
students again, learning a new contract law.
Then there are the cultural considerations. Is not the law of contract 
part of each country’s heritage?1 Is there not a cultural value in both the 
intellectual thrill and joy which seize common lawyers when they study 
the cases and try to extract the rules of law which these cases hide? Is 
not the French code civil peculiar to the Gallic spirit? The French poet 
Verlaine read it in order to improve the beauty of his poems. The Scan­
dinavians see their laws as expressing a specific Nordic mentality of so­
berness and simplicity. What is good law for one nation may be bad law 
for another. The truth about contract law is not the same for a Swede 
and an Italian, for an Englishman and for a German.
The arguments in favour of a Europeanisation of contract law are 
down-to-earth. They are mainly economic. The Union of today is an
1 Von Savigny has already stressed the connection between the spiriti of the peo­
ple (’ Volksgeist’)and the law, see von Savigny, Von Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzge­
bung und Rechtswissenschaft, Heidelberg 1814, reprinted in Hattenhauer, Thibaut 




























































































economic community. Its purpose is the free flow of goods, persons, 
services and capital. The idea is that the more freely and abundantly 
these can move across the frontiers, the wealthier and happier we will 
become. They move by way of contracts. It should therefore be made 
easier to conclude and perform contracts and to calculate contract risks. 
Those doing business abroad know that some of their contracts with for­
eign partners will be governed by foreign law. The unknown laws of the 
foreign countries is one of their risks. Foreign laws are often difficult for 
the businessmen and their local lawyers to understand. They may keep 
him away from foreign markets in Europe. It is the aim of the Union to 
do away with restrictions of trade within the Community, and thus the 
differences of law which restrict this trade should be abolished. The ex­
isting variety of contract laws in Europe may be regarded as a non-tariff 
barrier to the trade.
And contract law is not folklore. It is a question of ethics, economics 
and technique. It is possible to draft common principles favourable for 
the economy and technically expedient. It has even been possible to 
reach agreement on a world-wide basis. In 1980, delegates from all over 
the world succeeded in adopting the CISG, which came into force in 53 
states covering almost every legal culture in the world, at the beginning 
of 1999.
The claim for uniformity should come from the people, notably the 
businessmen who eventually will find it bothersome, costly and risky to 





























































































Those in Europe who wish to see themselves as citizens both of their 
nation and region and of Europe will find it a reinforcement of their al­
legiance to Europe that private law, or an important part of it, has be­
come European law.
2 Can we content ourselves with the existing Europeanisation?
In the last decades there have in fact been important developments of 
what may be called the Union contract law. Most important is perhaps 
the directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts,2 but the EEC has 
also issued several other directives providing protection of the consumer 
as a contracting party3 and the employee. Furthermore, the Union has 
established a law of competition which purports to prevent restrictive 
trade practices. Some rules of this law provide restrictions of the parties’ 
contractual freedom by laying down which contract terms are permissi­
ble and which are not. A Directive of 18 December 1986 on the Self- 
employed Agent4 contains mandatory rules most of which protect the 
agent in his relationship with the principal.
The Union legislation mentioned above has provided some Europe­
anisation of contract law. However, it is only a fragmented harmonisa-
2 93/13 of 5 April 1993, OJEC L 95/1993, 29.
3 See, for instance, directives on Doorstep Sales (20 Dec. 1985, no 85/577), Con­
sumer Credit (22 Dec. 1986, no 87/102), Package Tours (13 June 1990, no 90/314) and 
Time Share Agreements (26 Oct. 1994, no 94/47).




























































































tion. It is not well co-ordinated, and, since the national laws of contract 
are different, it causes problems when it has to be adjusted to the various 
national laws. There is no European law of contract to support these 
specific measures.
The uniform choice of law rules of the Rome Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 19 June 19805 lay down which 
legal system governs contracts with foreigners. These choice of law 
rules are now in force in all the Member States. Their purpose is to give 
the businessman the means to know when his contract will be governed 
by the contract rules of his own law and when it will be subject to the 
rules of a foreign law. Art 3 of the Convention provides that the parties 
may agree on which legal system to apply. A Greek seller and a Swed­
ish buyer may, for instance, agree that Greek or Swedish law shall gov­
ern their contract. If they want a neutral system to govern their contract, 
they may choose English law. If they have not made such a choice of 
law the courts must apply the legal system with which the contract has 
its closest connection; see art 4. This is presumed to be the legal system 
of the party who provides the goods or services which the other party 
buys, in the example mentioned above it would be Greek law because 
the seller is a Greek.6
5 80/934 EEC, OJEC 9 Oct 1980, No L 266/1.
6 to some cases, the rules of the Convention will leave some uncertainty as to 
which law a court will apply; see on this issue Lando in the King’s College Law 




























































































However, the contracts which are to be governed by an unknown for­
eign law will cause the businessman problems. A Swedish party will 
generally not know what Greek contract law provides. If the parties 
have agreed on English law as a “neutral” system, they will both have 
problems in ascertaining what English law provides.
If the case is tried by a Swedish court, the Greek party will have no 
assurance that his or her own, Greek, law will be applied, even though 
the rules of the Convention provide that Greek law should be applied. In 
the courts of most countries, a foreign law will have to be pleaded and 
proved, and to prove its content is often expensive and difficult. As most 
lawyers and judges do not like foreign laws and thus try to avoid them, a 
party will often find that his or her own law will not be applied.7
It is therefore submitted that the Rome Convention’s choice of law 
rules are poor tools of legal integration. They have not established the 
legal uniformity necessary for an integrated market. There is still some 
truth in what, in his colourful language, the Heidelberg professor Anton 
Friedrich Justus Thibaut said about the situation in Germany in 1814 
when the country was divided in a multitude of legal systems : “If there 
is no unity of laws, then the terrible and odious practice of the conflict
of laws will arise.... so that in their intercourse the poor subjects will be
stuck and suffocated in such a constant maze of uncertainty and shock
7 See European University Institute, Integration Through Law, (eds Cappelletti, 
Seccombe and Weiler) Volume 1, Book 2, Part II, p 161ff, Conflict o f Laws as a 




























































































that their worst enemies could not advise them worse. Unity of law 
would, however, make smooth and safe the road of the citizen from one 
state to the other, and wicked lawyers would no longer have the oppor­
tunity to sell their legal secrets and thereby extort and maltreat the poor 
foreigners”.8
3 The Commission on European Contract Law
Since 1982, the Commission o f  European Contract Law has worked to 
establish the Principles o f  European Contract Law (PECL). These prin­
ciples are drafted as articles and supplied with comments which explain 
the operation of the articles. In these comments, there are illustrations: 
ultra short cases which show how the rules are to operate in practice. In 
addition, there are notes which tell of the sources of the mies. Part one 
of the Principles dealing with performance, non-performance and reme­
dies was published in 1995.9 In 1992 the Second Commission on Euro­
pean Contract Law began to work on the formation, validity, interpreta­
tion and contents of contracts and on the authority of an agent to bind 
his principal. Part two of the Principles, which will comprise a revised 
version of Part one, was sent to the printer in September 1998, and is 
scheduled to be in the book shops in early 1999. In 1997, the Third
8 See Thibaut, Über die Notwendigkeit eines allgemeinen bürgerlichhen Rechts in 
Deutschland, Heidelberg 1814, reprinted in Hattenhauer, Thibaut und Savigny, Ihre 
programmatischen Schriften, München 1973, 61ff, p 33f.
9 Lando & Beale (eds) Principles o f European Contract Law, Part 1. Performance, 




























































































Commission began to draft rules on illegality, set-off, assignment of 
claims, subrogation, assumption of debt, plurality of creditors and debt­
ors, and prescription.
With a few exceptions, the members of the Commission of European 
Contract Law have been academics, but many of the academics are also 
practising lawyers. The Members have not been representatives of spe­
cific political or governmental interests, and they have all pursued the 
same objective: to draft the most appropriate contract rules for Europe.
The same spirit has governed in the Working Group which prepared 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 
These Principles, which were published in 1994 by the UNIDROIT in 
Rome, cover almost the same subjects as Part two of the PECL. They 
are meant for the world but are not intended to become a Code. They are 
optional rules, a World Restatement on the Law of Contracts.
The working methods of the two groups have many traits in common. 
Some of the members participated in both groups and the mutual give 
and take was considerable. There are some differences between the rules 
of the two texts, but most of them are similar, if not in formulation, then 
in substance. The rules on formation of contracts, and on performance, 
non-performance (breach of contract) and remedies for non-performance 
resemble those of the Vienna Sales Convention (CISG). As long as the 
PECL have not been codified, they will also operate as a Restatement, 
and there is a common core in the two texts which will have a consider­




























































































One of the rules common to the CISG, the PECL and the UNIDROIT 
Principles is that each party should act in accordance with good faith 
and fair dealing. Applications of this principle appear in several other 
rules, but it is meant to be broader than those specific applications and 
should, in general, govern the behaviour of the contracting parties. An­
other is that a party who has a contractual duty to achieve a specific re­
sult, such as a seller who is to deliver goods to the buyer, is bound to 
achieve that result, and will, subject to force majeure, commit a breach 
of com act and be liable to damages if he fails to do so. A third is that a 
party who has to pay damages for breach of contract will only have to 
cover the loss which he foresaw, or could reasonably foresee, which 
would follow as a likely result of the breach. A fourth is the principle of 
proportionality which inter alia governs the exercise of remedies for 
breach of contract; thus, only a fundamental breach of contract by one 
party should entitle the other party to terminate the contract.
Other rules are accepted by the UNIDROIT Principles and the Euro­
pean Principles only and not by the CISG. One such rule is the so-called 
hardship rule under which the terms of a contract may be modified or 
the contract brought to an end if the performance becomes excessively 
onerous to one party because of an unexpected change of circumstances. 
Another deals with the battle o f form  situation; when they made their 
contract, the parties were in agreement except that the offer and accep­
tance referred to conflicting general conditions. In this case, a contract is 
formed, and the general conditions form part of the contract to the extent 
that they are common in substance; in so far as they are in conflict, the 




























































































droit) will generally govern the issue. A third is the rule on the profes­
sional 's written confirmation; if professionals have concluded a contract 
but have not embodied it in a final document, and one, without delay, 
sends the other a writing which purports to be a confirmation of the 
contract, but which contains additional or different terms, such terms 
will become part of the contract unless the terms materially alter the 
terms of the contract, or the addressee objects to them without delay.
4 Is the Europeanisation o f  the contract law feasible?
Can the 15 or more States agree on a unified contract law? Europe is 
still divided by different legal languages, methods and rules. The Civil 
law countries on the Continent and the Common law countries on the 
British Isles have a different approach to the law and a different legal 
language, but even on the Continent itself, there are significant differ­
ences.
However, the members of the Commission on European Contract 
Law, most of whom were academics, shared the same legal values; there 
was a remarkable unanimity when it came to the question of how a case 
would be solved under the existing national laws. In the discussions, the 
participants would consider how the courts of their own country had or 
would have reacted to a case, and they often found that although the 
rules were different, the courts had or would have reached the same re­
sults. The consensus was greater than one would have expected when 




























































































The Court of Justice of the European Communities has judges from 
all the Member Countries and some of these Judges have spoken of a 
similar experience. There is often agreement about the outcome of a 
case, although the reasons for the decision may vary considerably.
Very often, the members of the Commission had the same views with 
respect to how they thought the law should be. There were, of course, 
differences of opinion. A few of them reflected national attitudes, but 
most of them reflected the individual attitudes of the members. For in­
stance, some members believed more than others that the parties should 
be given an extensive freedom of contract. Some wanted detailed rules, 
others preferred general principles which left more room for the discre­
tion of the courts.
Several factors have caused this common attitude. The similar eco­
nomic and political structure of the Member States is one. Another is 
their common cultural heritage. All Europeans share the Christian ethic, 
and have been influenced by Roman law and the great moralists. The 
milieu in which both judges and law professors are raised and live is 
also a factor. Most of the guardians and preachers of our law and justice 
grew up in well-to-do bourgeois homes with moral traditions. In Europe, 
the middle class has been the guardian of ethics, and so have the parents 




























































































yers in spe were good and relatively virtuous students with strong ties to 
their home.10
Thus, the legal values of the European brotherhood of lawyers are 
very similar. And so are, it is submitted, the legal values of the Euro­
pean peoples who live in societies of a similar economic, and political 
structure and share the same ethics. This should make it possible to 
make a European Code of Obligations.
5 The two schools: the cultivators and the codifiers
Some lawyers, notably among the academics, realise that European 
contract law should be harmonised or unified. There are, however, two 
opinions as to how this should be done, two schools, which we will call 
the codifiers and the cultivators. What divides them is the question as to 
whether the uniform law should be imposed upon the peoples of Europe 
by way of codification (legislation) or lulled into them by a patient per­
suasion and cultivation.11
10 See Kaupen, Die Hüter von Recht und Ordnung. Die soziale Herkunft, Erzie­
hung und Ausbildung der deutschen Juristen, 2d ed. 1971, and R alf Darendorf, The 
education o f an Elite. Law Faculties and German Upper Class. Transactions of the 
5th World Congress o f Sociology, Louvain-La-Neuve 1964, 259-274.
11 See, for example, Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny’s Legacy. Legal History, 
Comparative Law and the Emergence of a European Legal Science, 112 Law Quar­
terly Review (1996) 576, and Hein Kötz, Gemeineuropisches Zivilrecht, Festschrift 
fur Konrad Zweigert, Tübingen 1981, 481. In several meetings, Kötz has advocated 




























































































A European Contract Law, the cultivators say, should grow organi­
cally and slowly in the people, led by the academics who, in their writ­
ings, should establish the law. They should be helped by the interna­
tional business community whose organisations should establish what 
they call common customs and practices. This new European law should 
then be taught to the law students, who, when they become judges, will 
apply it in their decisions. The cultivators refer to the proud tradition of 
Roman Law, which spread in Europe from the time of the glossators of 
the 12th century, and which reigned in Continental Europe till it was re­
placed by the codifications of the 19th century. The cultivators see the 
universities as the main platform for the debates on the future civil law 
of Europe. They imagine that the writings of learned scholars and So- 
cratic seminars under the palm trees of the academia will distil the ul­
tima ratio and establish a European Contract Law.
In the last decades, the EEC and the European Union have promoted a 
European regime of - mostly academic - lawyers whose platform is no 
longer their own country but Europe and whose writings and debates are 
on the future European law. This regime has established and promoted 
an interchange of law students, European law reviews and books, such 
as Kotz & Flessner's European Contract Law.'2
12 The first o f the two volumes of this book, Hein Kötz, Europäisches Ver­
tragsrecht, 1, deals with formantion, validity, content o f contract, and contract and 
third parties. It was published in 1996. An English translation European Contract 




























































































This regime of lawyers is also necessary for the codifiers who wish 
for a European Contract Code. Furthermore, they need European text­
books and articles to be discussed among academics, and European 
Contract Law to be taught in classrooms before and after it has been 
codified.
Several academics in Europe, notably in Germany, belong to the cul­
tivators and wish European contract law to be developed in this soft 
way. They point to the fact that the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts and the PECL all agree on a num­
ber of principles and rules which could form part of a European, if not a 
world “Gemeines Recht
One could now ask whether the writings of the academics and their 
discussions can bring about a Europeanisation of the contract law. Will 
the judges disregard a provision in their national code or change a well- 
established case law of their country in order to bring it in accordance 
with the Common Core? Would the French courts in civil and commer­
cial matters introduce a rule on imprevision similar to the hardship rule 
just mentioned? Would the English courts adopt the good faith principle 
as a general principle of contract law?
Whether the courts will change the law depends upon several factors. 
In some countries the courts allow themselves more freedom to develop 
the law than in others. The German and the Dutch appeal courts have 
been more daring than the courts of other European countries which are 






























































































the new European jus commune.'3 And even in Germany and the Neth­
erlands, the temperaments of the judges differs. Some regard themselves 
as social engineers, others as obedient followers of the statute or the 
precedent.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities has made an at­
tempt to persuade national courts to give their own national law an in­
terpretation which brings this law into accordance with community di­
rectives governing relationships between the citizens. The Court has 
ruled that, until they are implemented by the national legislator, such” 
horizontal” directives have no direct effect and cannot create rights and 
duties between citizens, even when the state has not implemented them 
when it should. However, in a ruling in Carte Ingles S.A v Christina 
Blaquez Rivero14 the European Court advised the Spanish court to inter­
pret Spanish law so as to bring it into conformity with the EC Package 
Tour Directive which Spain should have, but had not yet, implemented. 
However, in his judgment following the ruling, the Spanish Juzgado de 
Primera Instancia Sevilla refused to use this “interpretation” inviting it 
to violate the clear text of the Spanish civil code.
Although a certain rapprochement among the legislatures and among 
the appeal courts in Europe has been noticed in the last decades, it is
13See on the problems caused by such ‘hidden changes’ o f national law by way of 
“interpretation“, Irene Klauer, Die Europaisierung des Privatechts, Baden-Baden 
1997, 5Iff.





























































































doubtful how far the courts can and will go without any mandate from 
the national legislator. The main objection to the idea of the cultivators 
is, therefore, that the rules of the New Restatements would probably not 
be adopted by the courts in the way the cultivators imagine. Today, 
neither on the Continent nor in the British Isles, will or can the courts 
free themselves of the fetters of the law laid down in the national codes, 
statutes or precedents. A unified law can only be applied by the courts 
of Europe if the legislator tells the court that they must. A  European 
Civil Code has to be prepared, passed and promulgated. One will have 
to tolerate a certain polycentrism, but there should be certainty about the 
main principles. Together with the practising lawyers and the judges, the 
doctors should work these principles out, but they have to be passed, 
either by the legislatures of the Union Countries or by the Council and 
the Parliament of the European Union which, by the way, both in 1989 
and 1994 requested the Commission and the Council to prepare a Euro­
pean Civil Code.15
Another objection which may be raised to a “soft” unification brought 
about by the academics is that it will be difficult to establish a system of 
simple and clear rules in this way. It will not be easy to base a uniform 
law on academic debates. European lawyers are still divided by different 
legal languages and methods. To the differences in the academic back­
ground of the European professors one must add that most academics 
are persons of a marked individuality. Many of the rules which are pro-
15 See Resolutions o f 26 May 1989, OJEC 1989 C 158/ 400 and o f 6 May 1994, 




























































































posed in the UNIDROIT Principles and in the PECL are the same, but 
there are also differences which cannot be explained by the fact the 
UNIDROIT Principles are for the world and the PECL for Europe. Such 
are due to the fact that most of the members were different individuals. 
Already Thibaut has warned against a law which, like the Roman law, 
was based on the doctrine of the learned society: “There is nothing 
which we good jurists like more than to hold the opinions of others to be 
inadvisable for the very reason that they are the opinions of others”.16 
When the Roman Law reigned in Europe, its many and contradictory 
sources created a great amount of insecurity. “It cannot be denied”, said 
Thibaut, “that Roman law has been conductive for our learned endeav­
ours, notably for the study of philosophy and history, and that this great 
enigmatic mass has sharpened the lawyers’ faculty of combination and 
has given them ample opportunity to practice, and to glorify themselves. 
The citizen, however, may rightly claim that he was not bom for the 
lawyers... The citizen’s happiness does not ask for the learned counsel, 
and we would sincerely thank the heavens if simple laws would bring 
about that the lawyers were dissuaded from their learning...”17
The mess described by Thibaut was, to some extent, cleared when the 
French Civil Code was introduced in a number of European countries. 
Compared with the former law, the Code was clear and succinct, force­
ful in its language and free from detailed digressions. As was said by
16 Thibaut, op. cit note 8, p 21 f.




























































































Portalis in his Discours préliminaire: ’’The task of the legislation is to 
determine the general maxims of law, taking a large view of the matter. 
It must establish principles rich in implications {féconde en con­
séquences) rather than descend into the details of every question which 
might possibly arise”. Like the French Civil Code, a European Code 
must strive at simplicity. When drafting the Principles, the Commission 
of European Contract Law has tried to follow the device of the authors 
of the French Civil Code.
A slow cultivation may have its advantages. It is easier to accustom 
lawyers to a slow, than to a sudden, reform. However, it will probably 
take a long time to achieve Europeanisation in this way as is shown by 
the experience of the United Kingdom. In almost 300 years, the English 
and the Scots have lived together in a Union. They have basically the 
same culture and speak the same language Most of the uniform law 
they have has been brought about by legislation, but since this legisla­
tion has not touched upon the basic principles of private law which is 
still unwritten, the Scots and the English each have their own system of 
law. The Union of today has at least 16 legal systems and 11 languages. 
If no legislative measure is taken, the peoples of the Union will probably 
continue to have different contract rules. Those who want to establish a 
European Contract Law by way of a natural outgrowth must arm them­
selves with great patience.
6 The future avenues
The future European law of contract may take several avenues. One is 




























































































ropeanisation which may follow from continued debates between mem­
bers of a growing European academia on the principles of contract law, 
supported by the efforts of the business world to make uniform customs, 
standard form contracts and contract terms. In this way, an unwritten 
European jus commune may eventually emerge. It will be somewhat dif­
fuse and polycentric, but it may straighten out some of the differences of 
the national laws. This is what the cultivators wish.
Another avenue is the mandatory unification, a European Civil Code 
covering the law of contracts. This is what the codifiers want, and I am, 
as you can guess, one of them. One must expect that intensive trade will 
create a need for the greater amount of legal certainty which a Code will 
provide. World trade has grown very fast, and this has brought CISG 
into existence. In the European Union, where trade between the Member 
states has increased even more since 1958, the more trade and commu­























































































































































































The Work of the Lando-Commission 
from an Alternative Viewpoint
A Comment on Professor Lando’s Exposition
Kristina Preinerstorfer
1 Introduction
One way to approach the complex issue of Europeanisation of Private 
Law is to focus on private initiatives. The Lando-Commission1 is one of 
them; it has become one of the most noted ‘non-governmental’ unifica­
tion projects within private law. For more than twenty years an ever 
growing number2 of legal academics drawn from all the Member States
1 I use the popular, though not official, expression ‘Lando-Commission’, refer­
ring to the chairman and initiator o f the project, Professor Lando from Copenhagen 
Business School. The Lando-Commission’s official name is ‘Commission on Euro­
pean Contract Law’ (CECL). For more information see the Lando-Commission’s 
homepage at: http://www.ufsia.ac.be/~estorme/CECL.html




























































































of the European Community has been working on behalf of this project, 
elaborating common European principles of contract law.3
There is a clear and convincing reason why, in the early seventies, the 
Lando-Commission initiated a project to achieve a Community-wide 
uniform legal basis for contract law: the Lando-Commission begins 
from the supposition that the mere unification of international private 
law rules cannot satisfy the needs of the common European market. The 
unification of rules on ‘choice of law’ cannot avoid the fact that, for in­
stance, for a Milan pasta producer, Palermo is closer than Munich.4 This 
geographic/economic paradox stems from the fact that differences be­
tween the legal systems of the Member States give rise to transaction 
costs for businessmen. From this geographic/economic point of view, 
trading under the laws of one country seems more attractive than ex­
porting goods under foreign and usually less familiar laws — even if the 
frontier might be near at hand. The example mirrors the problematical 
situation to which the whole idea of the European market integration 
must respond: divergent rules of contract law may give rise to distor­
tions of competition or deter businessmen or consumers from cross-
3 The first results were published in book form in 1995: Ole LandoIHugh Beale 
(eds.), The Principles o f European Contract Law, Part I. Performance, Non­
performance and Remedies, Dortrecht 1995.
4 This example refers to Professor Lando’s famous question to his students ‘how 
many miles it is to the frontier’; further, Ole Lando, European Contract Law, in: 
Peter Sarcevic (ed.), International Contracts and Conflicts o f Law, London, Dor­




























































































border sale or purchase of goods and services. Thus, in order to com­
plete a common market without frontiers, one must eliminate such ob­
stacles to cross-border contracts, created by differing national rules of 
contract law.5 The unification of rules on ‘choice of law’, such as the 
EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,6 
may have its merits but necessarily fails in terms of market integration. 
For, assuming the existence of different legal systems, the idea of uni­
fying international private law cannot sufficiently respond to the practi­
cal needs of the common market.7 The Lando-Commission proposes a 
Community-wide, uniform ‘infrastructure’ for the contractual relation­
ships of parties doing business. It provides for a set of rules detached 
from national legal systems and thus facilitating cross-border trade 
within Europe. Apparently, projects such as the Lando-Commission 
provide a solution to very practical needs. By the same token, however, 
the presentation and analysis of the work of the Lando-Commission re­
veal the normative concerns behind such an initiative. In fact, the de-
5 Cf. Ole Lartdo, Principles o f European Contract Law: An Alternative to or a 
Precursor o f European Legislation?, (1992) 40 The American Journal o f Compara­
tive Law (Am.J.Comp.L.), 574.
6 1980 Rome Convention of the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 
O.J. 1998 C 27/98, p. 34 ff. (consolidated version).
7 That is why some authors speak of “second best solution” if they talk about 
the unification of rules on ‘choice of law’; cf. for instance Helmut Heiss, Europäis­





























































































mands of the business world for common European rules only indicate 
the tip of an ‘iceberg’ lying underneath.
What makes the Lando-Commission and their Principles of European 
Contract Law interesting is the fact that the project does not simply at­
tempt to resolve the practical concerns mentioned; limited to its prag­
matic function the effect of the Principles of European Contract law ap­
pears a little unrealistic; one may indeed wonder, if the collection of 
mere ‘Principles’ can at all meet the needs of the highly specialised and 
complex business community of modem Europe.
However, what at first sight seems to be too cautious an approach, 
acquires a rather complex dimension once we look at the range of con­
troversial fundamental and policy issues underlying the Europeanisation 
process. The most striking development is the rise of a new scheme of 
governance distinct from traditional governance structures: the building 
of the European Union has brought about a system of ‘multi-level gov­
ernance’ in Europe.8 In transforming sovereign European nation states 
into members of a new political entity sui generis, the classical dualism 
of states and international organisation has been transgressed. New 
forms of non-national and non-state structures of governance have been 
established, regulatory policies have been Europeanised. Applying this
See Christian Joerges, Oliver Gerstenberg (eds.), Private Governance, Demo­
cratic Constitutionals and Supranationalism. Proceedings of the COST A7 seminar. 





























































































perspective to the field of private law, the impact of European integra­
tion on (systems of) national private law becomes discernible. Since the 
building of the European entity has been guided by strategies of market 
building, new institutional frameworks of economic and social regula­
tion have been created. Market-driven regulations at European level 
have been increasingly intervening in national private law. Europe, and 
no longer the legislation of the Member States, determines the extent of 
the realm of private ordering. Thus, the efforts of the Lando- 
Commission have to be seen in the light of the emergence of this new 
scheme of governance in Europe. From this ‘constitutional vantage 
point’, the exemplary nature of the work of the Lando-Commission be­
comes visible.
It is this vision which I will elaborate in this paper. The essence of my 
argument is to perceive the Lando-Commission as working in two, at 
first sight contrasting, directions: a wide and a narrow one. The wide 
perspective on the one hand does not confine the project of the Lando- 
Commission merely to its pragmatic function; the Lando-Commission is 
more than just the answer to the practical needs of the business world. It 
serves, at the same time, to correct the deficiencies in such ongoing pro­
cesses as the Europeanisation of private law and/or the trans­
nationalisation of contract law. The narrow perception on the other hand 
limits the critical function attributed to the Lando-Commission to that of 



























































































differs from the Lando-Commission’s self-perception as a ‘legislative’ 
project.9
According to these thoughts, the article is structured as follows. In the 
first part of the narrative (2) I will outline the wide view of the Lando- 
Commission’s project, arguing that the Lando-Commission’s endeavour 
represents a symptom of both the impact of European integration on pri­
vate law (2a) and the general paradigm shift in contract law (2b). 
Drawing upon the conclusions from this more expansive account, I will 
turn to the narrow account of the Lando-Commission’s project in the 
second part of the narrative (3), arguing that the Lando-Commission’s 
desire for codification is too ambitious an outlook (3a) and that Europe­
anisation from ‘below’10 might be a more satisfactory response to the 
peculiarities of the Europeanisation process (3b). In light of the insights 
obtained, one wonders how the critical functions attributed to the 
Lando-Commission can be realised. In the conclusion, I devote particu­
lar attention to one institutional actor which might be able to fulfil this 
task: the European judiciary.
9 See Ole Landò in op. cit., note 3.




























































































2 Extended Perspectives on the Lando-Commission and Its Work
a) European (Dis-)Integration o f Private Law
In the process of European integration we are confronted with a 
striking paradox: on the one hand, the law has been the main tool for 
integration. On the other hand, this same law has operated as a disrup­
tive factor when it comes to the coherence of national legal systems." 
The impact of a body of supranational rules on the municipal level has 
sometimes had the effect of making the unity and rationality which are 
necessary for the efficient operation of the legal machine less attainable. 
The structure of national legal systems has being subjected to Commu­
nity regulation, so that the basic orientation of our legal systems as well 
as individual legal fields have been affected; for legal academics in par­
ticular, confusion rather than order has gained the upper hand. In Europe 
one is thus dealing with a meta-national reshaping of private law rules, 
which can no longer be explained without giving serious consideration 
to the ongoing and pervasive number of disintegrative processes.
The background-logic of these influences is strongly characterised by 
rationales of an economic and social nature: since the building of the 
European entity has been guided by strategies of market building, new 
institutional frameworks of economic and social regulation have been 
created. These European activities in economic law and social regula-
11 Cf. Christian Joerges, The Impact o f European Integration on Private Law: 
Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective, 




























































































tion do not only affect the European economy but also the (national) de­
velopment of private law. In this context, examples of market-driven 
regulations at the European level might be discussed which have had a 
selective impact on national private law, such as the Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts.12 The result of such an analysis (which I 
cannot undertake in this essay, since I am restricting myself to the work 
of the Lando-Commission) would clearly demonstrate that it is no 
longer the legislation of the Member States which determines the extent 
of the ‘private’, but European economic and social regulation, following 
a logic quite distinct from traditional law-making policies of nation 
states.
There are different ways to respond to these meta-national influences 
on our law. One is to accept them as anomalies. Another is to assimilate 
the resulting changes into the existing legal systems. However, the 
European machine is accelerating, producing an ever more confusing 
amount of supranational rules and thereby extensively affecting the 
deeper structures of our legal systems. It is becoming more and more 
doubtful whether our traditional legal systems are able to respond to 
these developments in a satisfactory way.13 An alternative approach to 
the scenario outlined has been undertaken by the Lando-Commission.
12 Council Directive of 5 April 1993 (93/13/EEC), OJ L 95 o f 21 April 1993,23
13 Joerges, The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation Process and 
as a Contest o f Legal Disciplines. An Analysis o f the Regulation o f Unfair Terms in 




























































































Their Principles of European Contract Law, to ‘consolidate the rapidly 
expanding volume of Community law regulating specific types of con­
tract’,14 provide for a legal framework of common European principles 
— a Community-wide infrastructure of contract law. The promising 
potential of the Lando-Commission is to reach a compromise between 
the obvious need for a common legal framework of contract law and the 
patchwork character of European legislative activities. The merits and 
fascination of such an approach seem to derive from an implicit scepti­
cism: the Lando-Commission’s initiative is a symptom of the failing 
process of integration as far as private law is concerned; i.e. the institu­
tional incapacity, at both European and national level, to cope with the 
complexity of legal integration.
Considering both these levels (i.e. European and national) it is im­
portant to note that the initiative of the Lando-Commission does not 
belong exclusively to either of these levels; the group rather operates in 
a sphere detached from either. On the one hand, although aiming to dis­
cover ‘European’ principles of private law, the initiative is not a purely 
European one. For the Lando-Commission is neither dependent on the 
European authorities nor has it ever received a mandate from the Euro­
pean Union. On the other hand, the participants of the Lando-initiative, 
although representing different nation states, have no mandate from 
their national governments; rather, a new member is chosen and invited 
to participate by the common consent of the whole group. As members





























































































of the Lando-Commission they are not political representatives of their 
national governments, but might be seen as ‘scientific’ representatives 
of their national legal systems. Each member’s intention is to report on 
his or her respective national legal rules in order to facilitate the co­
operative discovery of the common core of all European private law 
systems. To put it in other words: according to the Lando-Commission’s 
analysis, common European principles shall be discovered by cross- 
border, non-governmental, scientific co-operation among jurists from all 
the Member States of the Union. This ‘private’ effort by legal experts is 
the crucial and distinctive feature of this project, thus rendering it re­
markable. Whilst neither our national legislators nor our traditional legal 
systems (such as private international law) can any longer satisfy the 
needs of a united Europe, the thinking of the Lando-Commission allows 
the introduction of considerations of market integration or harmonisa­
tion of laws into the private law arena — without the underlying pres­
sure of political considerations.15
This idea opens up a new way to mediate between the two levels of 
private law regulation, the national and the European, which at first 
sight seem to be irreconcilable. Thus, the Lando-Commission is more 
than a philanthropic enterprise by some legal academics meeting several
15 I am aware that this political independence is only one side of the coin and 
could also perceived as a lack of responsibility. Indeed, one could criticise the con­
ception of the Lando-Commission as suffering a legitimacy deficit. In the conclusion 





























































































times a year at their own expense in different universities across Europe. 
Keeping in mind the scenario established by the integration project (i.e. 
the regulatory functions of European legislation, the institutional 
framework of the European economy, their fundamental impact upon 
private law, the affect on the realm of private ordering etc.), one comes 
to appreciate the evolutionary and critical perspective on the Europeani­
sation process which the work of the Lando-Commission brings.
b) The Paradigm Shift in the Law Governing Contractual Rela­
tions
As indicated, the process of Europeanisation of private law is charac­
terised by a re-shaping of private law rules at a meta-national level. 
Contract law in this respect offers an interesting example. For, crucially, 
contract law has been witnessing the phenomenon of denationalisation 
even before the process of integration had begun — and this develop­
ment has been accelerating since'the Europeanisation process. In fact, 
specifically in the area of contract law, transformations have been occur­
ring for decades, leading to the phenomenon that codified law is highly 
divergent from the reality of contemporary contract practice. This de­
velopment is due to the fact that, after the codification era, the functions 
of contract law have been subject to an irreversible paradigm shift. As 
the core area of private law closest to the market, the evolution of con­
tract law must be seen in light of the expansion and internationalisation 
of trade and economics. There are indeed several factors on which the 
internationalisation (globalisation) process in the field of contract law is 
dependent: due to growing trade and economic relationships, the phe­




























































































nationalisation of contracts has increased, and there has been the rise of 
several new categories of contracts in order to regulate specific con­
tractual relationships (such as consumer contracts), setting new stan­
dards of social justice in the private sector.16 These factors mirror 
broader developments, for modem contract law is developing a dual 
commitment: freedom and coercion}1 This paradigm shift has to be seen 
as an irreversible global development.18 Contract law has been and will 
be further subject to a challenging process of globalisation.19
A very important feature of this process of trans-nationalisation is 
that, within their international organisations, business people have es-
16 In my LLM-Thesis, I entered into a deeper analysis cf. Kristina Preinerstorfer, 
Die Lando-Commission (Commission on European Contract Law). Rechtswissen­
schaft als Vermittler zwischen Europäisierungsprozeß und Privatrechtsentwicklung, 
LLM-Thesis, EUI Florence 1998.
17 Cf. Christian Joerges/Gert Brüggemeier, Europäisierung des Vertrags- und 
Haftungsrechts, in: Peter-Christian Müller-Graff (Hg.), Gemeinsames Privatecht in 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden 1993, S. 233ff (2nd edition forth­
coming).
18 Further, Leone Niglia, Contract Through Integration. The Impact o f the EEC 
Directive in Unfair Terms o f National Regimes of Law of Contract. Thesis EUI, 
San Domenico di Fiesole 1998, pp. 2 ff.
19 Several national legislators have been trying to respond to this paradigm shift 
in contract law, but only the Netherlands, the Nordic states, Louisiana and Quebec 
have managed to reform their codifications, whilst for instance Germany’s ‘Schul- 




























































































tablished common customs and practices beyond their national contract 
laws; arbitrators have applied general principles of law to international 
commercial disputes. This phenomenon has often been equated with 
Taw’ (lex mercatoria).20 The deficiencies of such a Taw’ are obvious: 
created by ‘private’ governance structures, it is not embedded in the tra­
ditional legal system. Hence, it is operating beyond the institutional 
frameworks and controlling influence of the traditional constitutional 
state. A new law has been emerging in a ‘paralegal’21 law-making proc­
ess, without an official (supra-) national authority being involved. Given 
the above-mentioned trans-nationalisation of contract law and the irre­
versible intensification of international economic activities, the issue of 
the deficiencies of the lex mercatoria will not go away. A serious analy­
sis of the work of the Lando-Commission therefore needs to take into 
account these current developments within contract law. In particular, 
one has to ask if the Principles of European Contract Law are able to 
correct deficiencies of ‘private’ governance structures as established by 
practice.
So far, we have seen that contemporary contract law has, for several 
decades, been affected by two important phenomena: codified national 
contract law has had to face the expanding trans-nationalisation of con­
tractual relationships, especially of the business community; by the
20 Cf. Filip deLy, International Business Law and Lex Mercatoria, Amsterdam, 
London, New York, Tokyo 1992




























































































same token it has been increasingly subject to the European regulation 
processes. Therefore, contract law is doubly forced to react: on the one 
hand, it is still exposed to the trans-nationalisation paradigm, on the 
other hand it is also exposed to the Europeanisation paradigm; in a nut­
shell, to a colourful pervading collection of disintegrative processes. 
Both developments have in common that they are opposed to national 
contract law traditions. Against this background, the discoveiy or crea­
tion of a ‘common’ European contract law hardly seems conceivable. 
Nevertheless, what seems unimaginable in theory may be feasible in 
practice. The Principles of European Contract Law have potential to 
consolidate the practical needs of contracting parties in socially and 
economically developed systems, providing a ‘common’ basis for con­
tractual relations and the patchwork character of European legislative 
activities. This incoherence is not just a ‘technical’ one. Rather, it is a 
normative challenge to traditional contract law. By way of meta-national 
reshaping of contract law rules, the Lando-Commission implicitly 
(rather than explicitly) responds to this normative challenge. The work 
of the Lando-Commission, thus, does not restrict itself to remedying the 
disintegrative interventions of European legislation; by the same token, 
it remedies the inability of national systems to respond to the paradigm 
shift in contract law. These observations have shown that the old pat­
terns of justice are undergoing drastic changes. Through projects such as 
the Lando-Commission, a new law-finding process is emerging, able to 
tame and/or remedy the meta-national legislative interventions, in areas 




























































































finding process about? Let us focus on the working methods of the 
Lando-Commission and the final objective the group wishes to achieve.
3 A Narrower Perspective than the Lando-Commission’s Perspec­
tive
a) Mandatory Europeanisation: Law-Making from “Above”
The specific intention of the Lando-Commission is apparently to fo­
cus on the creation of a Civil Code: the Principles of European Contract 
Law shall function as the first step towards a European Code of Con­
tracts.22 Such a perspective, as Professor Lando pointed out in his expo­
sition,23 echoes Thibaut’s idea of abstract and homogeneous codifica­
tion.24 Accordingly, the idea of codifying divergent legal rules of sover­
eign countries is not new. What is new — since Thibaut and/or the era 
of codification — is the European context, together with the social and 
economic paradigm shifts which; as we have seen, are having a particu­
lar impact on concepts of contract law. Against this background, the 
project of the Lando-Commission can be perceived as ‘codification’ at a 
higher level or, more accurately, mandatory Europeanisation of law. 
Examples of mandatory Europeanisation are, in the first place, European
22 Lando/Beale (n.3), preface, p. xvii.
23 Cf. Lando, in the first essay of this collection.
24 Über die Nothwendigkeit eines allgemeinen bürgerlichen Rechts in Deutsch­
land, 1814, reprinted in Hans Hattenhauer, Thibaut und Savigny, Dire programma­




























































































legislation, but also projects focusing on the objective of a European 
Civil Code. Its main character is the resolute applicability of legal rules 
once brought into force ‘from above’ i.e. by an official, legislative 
authority.
The question of ‘European codification of private law or not?’ is in­
deed at stake; the essence of all the arguments canvassed is the en­
forcement question. Among the supporters of mandatory Europeanisa­
tion, besides Lando, I might mention Tilmann,25 Schulze,26 Gandolfi,27 
and Sacco.28 These authors doubt that the mere writings of the academ­
ics and their discussions can bring about the Europeanisation of contract 
law,29 rather it must be ‘installed’ by a legislator. It is nearly ten years 
since the European Parliament, requesting a ‘common system o f private
25 Winfried Tilmann, Eine Privatrechtskodifikation fur die Europäische Gemein­
schaft? In: Peter-Christian Müller-Graff (ed), gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Eu­
ropäischen Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden 1993 (2nd edition forthcoming), pp. 485 ff.
26 Reiner Schulze, Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Zivilgesetzbuch?, 
(1997) 41 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2742 ff.
27 Giuseppe Gandolfi, Pour un code européen des contrats, 91 (1992) Revue Tri­
mestrielle du Droit Civil (Rev.Trim.DroitCivil) pp. 706 ff.
28 Rudolfo Sacco, The System of European Private Law. Premises for a Euro­
pean Code, (1992) Italian Studies in Law, 71 ff.




























































































law’,30 endorsed a European Civil Code. However, if we look at the pre­
sent state oflegislation, the enthusiastic pronouncement by Parliament 
seems to have remained mere wishful thinking. This enforcement deficit 
— even despite the involvement of a European institution — strength­
ens the arguments of those opposing codification. Such critical writers, 
such as Legrand,31 Zimmermann,32 and Kôtz,33 advance cultural argu­
ments such as the paradigm of legal traditions and national mentalities. 
According to these authors, every nation is too greatly infused with its 
own mentalité (Legrand)34 to accept an ‘outlandish’ law. A European 
Civil Code, in consequence, seems an illusory enterprise.351 do not want 
to elaborate further on this discussion nor on the reasons for the failure 
of the European codification idea, hitherto; what is important for me in
30 Resolution of the European Parliament o f 26 May 1989 (Doc.A2-157/89, OJ 
1989 C 158/401 p.400), eft. Resolution of 6 May 1994 (Doc.A3-329/94, OJ 1994 C 
205/94, p.518)
31 Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, (1996) 60 MLR 44 ff.
32 Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny’s Legacy. Legal History, Comparative Law 
and the Emergence of a European Legal Science, (1996) 122 Law Quarterly Review, 
576 ff.
33 Hein Kötz, Gemeineuropäisches Zivilrecht, in: Festschrift für Konrad Zwei­
gert, 1981,481 ff.
34 Legrand, p.44(n.31)
35 Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, (1997) 62 Modem Law Re­




























































































the context of my paper is the enforcement question which this discus­
sion raises. For the crucial enforcement of a Europeanised private law is 
feasible, and better achieved without the ‘drastic’ means of mandatory 
Europeanisation.
Hence, I believe that it is misleading to perceive the work of the 
Lando-Commission as an example of mandatory Europeanisation of 
private law. Even though Professor Lando is essentially right in reflect­
ing, in his essay, on how his Principles can come ‘into force’; further­
more, he is right in stressing the need for an institutional authority to 
fulfil this task, since the principles are a product of a mere ‘private’ ini­
tiative. Nevertheless, the enforcement of the Principles of European 
Contract Law must not necessarily be done by a national or European 
legislator. In my view, a European code may be a backward step.
b) Optional Europeanisation:
the Alternative Approach from ‘Below'
In fact, to perceive the Principles of European Contract Law as an ex­
ample of mandatory Europeanisation of law might be barely compatible 
with the overall logic of the integration process. With a view to the ob­
jective of establishing a common market, the Community operates a 
flexible system which builds on regulatory competition, mutual recog­
nition and selective harmonisation rather than a ‘static’ codex.36 Thus,
36 See, Karl Gleichmann, Methoden der Rechtsangleichung und Rechtsverein­
heitlichung innerhalb der EWG, in: Coing et al. (eds.), Methoden der Rechtsverein­




























































































the codification idea not only challenges national legal cultures (men- 
talités), but it also runs contrary to the incremental integration policy of 
the European Community. I would therefore argue that the Principles of 
European Contract Law are not necessarily a part of mandatory Europe­
anisation of private law, but might better be perceived as a promising 
example of optional Europeanisation, which stops one step before codi­
fication.
But what exactly is optional Europeanisation? It is a procedure which 
leaves it up to the actors involved (the parties) to decide whether they 
take an active part in the Europeanisation process. In the process of op­
tional Europeanisation, the rules are not imposed by a legislator, but 
from ‘below’. Distinct from national or European legislation, jurisdic­
tion and international conventions, optional ‘law’ is not automatically 
applicable. Rather, it is made applicable from ‘below’; the contracting 
parties decide if this alternative law shall govern their individual con­
tract. For instance, Article 1.101 (2) of the provisional complete and re­
vised version of the Principles of European Contract Law37 states:
‘These Principles will apply when the parties have agreed to incorpo­
rate them into their contract or that their contract is to be governed by 
them'. Thus, the Principles of European Contract Law leave it to the 
private parties to opt for them. Once adopted by private parties, the 
Lando-Principles come into force, and as a consequence, the parties are
37 The official publication o f this final text, including the second part o f the Prin­





























































































subject to mandatory rules established by the Principles (Article 1.102)38 
or to mandatory law ‘o f  national, supranational and international law 
which, according to the relevant rules o f  private international law, are 
applicable irrespective o f  the law governing the contract’ (Article 1.103 
Principles). This solution suggested by the Lando-Commission renders 
the issue of a code dispensable. Thus, I believe that we can content our­
selves with seeing the Principles of European Contract Law as a set of 
rules without ambitions to become a mandatory codification. In this 
sense, my interpretation of the Principles is narrower than that of Pro­
fessor Lando.
If considered in this narrow way, the work of the Lando-Commission 
resembles a famous example: that of the American Law Institute 
(ALI).39 The ALI is a private organisation of lawyers working on a sys­
tematic set of legal rules common to all states of the USA, published in 
several volumes: the Restatements on the Law. For, in the United States, 
as in the European Union, there are considerable differences between 
the contract laws of the individual states, and a common core has to be 
found. The American Law Institute began publishing Restatements as
38 A rticle 1.102 (1): ‘ Under these Principles, parties are free to enter into a 
contract and to determine its contents, subject to the requirements o f  good faith and 
fa ir dealing, and the mandatory rules established by these Principles’.
39 See fu rther Geoffrey C. Hazard, A m erican  L aw  Institute, 




























































































early as the beginning of the 1920s. This non-governmental,40 scientific 
initiative furthered a debate which has been based on common concepts 
and one common legal method. Without doubt a comparison between 
the Lando-Commission and the American Law Institute can be drawn; 
in fact, the Lando-Commission explicitly refers, in the introduction to 
the Principles of European Contract Law Part I,41 to the Restatements as 
a model, and the Lando-Principles have been called ‘European Restate­
ments’.42 Both initiatives provide solutions for lawyers and national 
courts in cases where their own law is silent or where their law is in 
need of reform, and such reform may be brought about by the courts.
40 There has never been a governmental order in respect o f the American Law 
Institute. It was founded in 1923 with the support o f the American Bar Association. 
As an initiative from legal science, it has been independent o f official, governmental 
will. Nevertheless, the ALI has political importance and might be attributed ‘quasi- 
legislatory’ authority. I elaborated on this point in my LLM Thesis: Die Lando- 
Kommission (Commission on European Contract Law) Rechtswissenschaft als 
Vermittler zwischen Europäisierungsprozeß und Privatrecht, Thesis EUI San Do­
menico di Fiesole 1998, 43 ff.
41 Lando/Beale, p. 9 (n.3).
42 See Christoph U. Schmid in the last essay of this collection; see also Helmut 
Heiss, Europäisches Vertragsrecht, 36 (1995) Zeitschrift fur Rechtsvergleichung 
(ZfRVgl.), p.56; Thomas Schindler, Die Restatements und ihre Bedeutung fur das 
amerikanische Privatrecht, 6 (1998) ZEuP, 276ffi; Arthur Rosett, Unification, Har­
monisation, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Commercial 




























































































What is important in the context of this essay is that the Restatements 
are not mandatory law. Thus, they are neither codified, nor enforced by 
any legislator. Nevertheless, the Restatements of the ALI are one of the 
most influential authorities in American law. In particular, the Restate­
ment on Contracts43 is one of the most successful products of the ALI, 
being highly appreciated by lawyers, courts and federal legislators and 
enjoying ‘quasi-legislative’ authority.
Hence, the example of the Restatements might demonstrate that, even 
where several divergent contract laws exist, the introduction of a code is 
unnecessary to ‘enforce’ common legal rules of private law, so long as 
the common rules are elaborated by legal experts and voluntarily ac­
cepted by official authorities such as legislators and courts. But the ex­
ample of the Restatements also shows that institutional support is indis­
pensable.44
4 Conclusion
The project of the Lando-Commission, taken as a point of reference, 
has revealed interesting insights into the needs of modem contract law 
and the demands of the Europeanisation process. They are very practical
43 Cf. American Law Institute, Restatements on Contracts 2nd, St. Pauls, Minne­
sota 1981.
44 Additionally, Professor Lando has pointed to this problem in focusing on the 
institutional realisation of his project; see Lando, Why codify the European Law of 




























































































needs, but cannot be answered through the medium of our traditional le­
gal disciplines (such as international private law), nor can they wait and 
hope for the elaboration of a comprehensive code. That is why I believe 
— on this point dissenting from Professor Lando — that the Principles 
of European Contract Law should not be perceived as an example of 
mandatory Europeanisation of private law. But we should value the 
Principles of European Contract Law as an exemplary model of optional 
Europeanisation. They offer an alternative way to curb and remedy 
European legislative interventions and at the same time to remedy defi­
ciencies of ‘private’ governance structures as established by practice 
{lex mercatoria). But how can the critical function ascribed to the Prin­
ciples of European Contract Law be put into practice?
There is one institutional actor, namely the European judiciary, which 
deserves particular attention. We have already seen that the Lando- 
Commission offers a set of rules which, at present, is a mere suggestion. 
Article 1.101 of the Principles of European Contract Law leaves it to the 
private parties to opt for them. But there might be reasons why private 
parties hesitate to choose such an option. Not only does the set of rules 
offered by the Lando-Commission consist of mere principles, the scope 
of which is moreover limited to contract law — hence, it is not compa­
rable with a coherent system of national private law. But also, the Prin­
ciples of European Contract Law in their present state have not been 
proven to work in practice; private parties will hesitate to adopt a set of 
rules to govern their contracts which has never before been adopted. 
Furthermore, the political independence of the Lando-Commission (as 




























































































Therefore, it is suggested that the judiciary could use the Principles of 
European Contract law when they are called to decide cases of contract 
law. In particular, the European Court of Justice could refer to the Prin­
ciples of European Contract Law in deciding issues of contract law and 
in applying principles of contract law common to the laws of the na­
tional Member States. The judiciary is in a position to shape the rather 
general rules which the Principles of European Contract Law contain, 
and clarify their meaning. But given the above-mentioned multi-level 
situation in Europe, a dialogue has to develop between and among 
European and national institutions to guarantee a homogenous standard 
of application. Thus, national courts deciding matters of private law, can 
also refer to the Principles of European Contract Law. In addition, we 
will need to take account of the education of our judges, as Professor 
Lando does when he maintains that ‘this new European law should then 
be taught to the students, who when they become judges will apply it in 
their decisions’.45 Professor Lando’s argument contains a very thought­
ful and observant account of the mentalité aspect invoked by Legrand 
(see above, point 3a). Finally, it is important to require that every time a 
national judge decides according to ‘European rules’, he or she shall be 
subject to powerful criticism from the European judiciary and from su­
pranational academic and institutional discourse.
To summarise: the work of the Lando-Commission does not only re­
spond to the specifics of the Europeanisation process and to the intema-
45 Lando, Why codify the European Law of contract? (1997) 5 European Review 




























































































tionalisation and globalisation of contractual relations. It should also be 
understood as an effort to preserve the ‘normative quality’ of private law 
in an post-legislative era. Thus, the Lando-Commission becomes a cru­
cial actor (of several) in a complex scheme of deliberation processes. 
Ideally, this picture should lead to a fruitful discourse culture between 
the actors within a system of multi-institutional governance; with the ju­























































































































































































“ INTEGRATIVE”  COMPARATIVE LAW ENTERPRISES
a n d  t h e  I n n e r  S t r a t if ic a t io n  o f  L e g a l  Sy s t e m s
Mauro Bussani
1 Introduction
The aim of this contribution is to put into context the cultural reasons 
which underpin a scholarly project. This project was launched five years 
ago by Ugo Mattei and myself, in light of both the current legal debate 
on European Legal Integration and the issue of the existence of Multi- 
Level-Legal Systems.
The Project we are concerned with is entitled “The Common Core of 
European Private law”.1 To date, it involves more than one hundred
1 The project was bom as a child of two cultural parents, both o f them very well 
known: the experience o f the Cornell Studies directed by R. Schlesinger in the 60s 
(see the balance struck by Rudolf B. Schlesinger himself: ‘The Past and Future of 
Comparative Law’, 43 Am. J. Comp. Law. 477, 479 (1995)) and the dynamic com­
parative law methodology developed by R. Sacco in the last 30 years (see, in Eng­
lish, Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’, 




























































































scholars mostly from Europe and the United States and should produce 
in due course the first published (by Cambridge University Press) re­
sults.
In the following pages I will first describe the immediate and long 
term goals of the project. I will then tackle the main differences between 
the “common core approach” and a series of apparently similar “inte­
grative” (to use Rudolf Schlesinger’s terminology)2 comparative law 
enterprises. Finally, I will try to put forward some remarks, within the 
perspective of a European legal integration, on the need to consider le­
gal systems as Multi-Level-Legal-Systems.
2 The Need fo r  a Map
Put in very simple terms, the above mentioned project seeks to un­
earth the common core of the body of European Private Law, within the 
general categories of Contract, Tort and Property. The search is for what 
is different and what is already common, if anything, behind the differ­
ent legal forms of the European Union Member States; legal forms 
which are differentiated not only along the lines of the civil law versus
o f the project see Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, ‘The Common Core Approach to 
European Private Law’, 3(3) Columbia J. Eur. L. 339 (1997-1998).




























































































common law heritage, but also by a number of other western legal tradi­
tions, or sub-traditions, according to the taxonomy one wishes to adopt.3
The three principal areas of property, tort and contract are divided 
into a number of topics4 and these are investigated through the key tool 
of the project constituted, as in the Cornell Seminars, by a questionnaire.
We have followed the general pattern of drafting our questionnaires 
with a sufficient degree of specificity to require the rapporteurs to an­
swer them in such a way that all of the circumstances affecting the law 
in their systems are addressed — including also all the circumstances 
that whilst not playing any official role, nevertheless have a practical 
impact on the operative rules. This should guarantee that rules formu-
3 Scandinavian systems are considered as a tradition sui generis by Zweigert 
and Kôtz: see Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kôtz, Introduction to Comparative Law  (3d. 
ed. 1998). The civil law is divided into Roman-inspired and German-inspired sys­
tems by the same authors and, with some nuances, by David (see René David & 
Camille Jauffret-Spinosi, Les grand systèmes de droit contemporains, 10th ed. 1992; 
see also René David & John E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World To­
day, 3d ed. 1985). Compare A. Gambaro & R. Sacco, Sistemi giuridici comparati, 
Torino, 1996. Scotland is generally considered a mixed legal system. See A. Gam­
baro & R. Sacco, Sistemi giuridici comparati, op cit.
4 Contract, Tort and Property are not used in this project in any positivistic legal 
sense. Their role - besides being labels to help in detecting the areas o f general ex­
pertise o f the contributors - is to serve as metalegal containers o f problems which are 
fairly easy to locate on operational grounds; the same grounds that show us how the 




























































































lated in an identical way (for instance by an identical code provision) 
but which may produce different applications, or even different rhetoric 
from commentators, will not be regarded as identical. This should also 
allow us to see the elements that may play an official and declared role 
in one system but which in another system may work in a more cryptic, 
unsystematic and unofficial way — the role of such cryptic elements 
being, of course, crucial when drafting a map of the applied law.5
This kind of research seems to be worth undertaking in order to ob­
tain at least the main outlines of a reliable geographical map of the law 
of Europe.
What use will be made of this map is of no concern for the cartogra­
phers drafting it. However, if reliable, it may become indispensable for 
whomever is entrusted with drafting European legislation6 — and this 
may be particularly so in the process which in Europe appears to lead 
incrementally towards the adoption of a general restatement and/or codi­
fication.7
5 See Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Comparazione giuridica e conoscenza del dato giuridico 
positivo’, in L apporto della comparazione alla scienza giuridica 241 (R. Sacco ed., 
1980).
6 See infra sub 3.
7 In respect of the huge work-in-progress of the group headed by prof. Giuseppe 
Gandolfi, based at Pavia University and consisting o f more than seventy scholars 
from throughout the European Union, see P. Stein (ed.), Incontro di studi su un fu ­




























































































For the transnational lawyer, indeed, the present European situation is 
like that of a traveller compelled to use a number of different local 
maps, each of them containing information which (due to the biased or 
hidden assumptions of municipal lawyers) is often misleading. We wish 
to correct this misleading information; but we do not wish to force the 
actual diverse reality of the law into one single map for the sake of uni­
formity. We are not drafting a city plan for something that will develop 
in the future and that we wish to influence.
This project seeks only to analyse the present complex situation in a 
reliable way. While we believe that cultural diversity in the law is an as­
set, we do not wish to take a preservationist approach. Nor do we wish 
to push in the direction of uniformity. This is possibly the most impor­
tant cultural difference between the Common Core project and other 
notable enterprises —  such as the Unidroit Principles, or the Lando 
Commission working on the feasibility of a European Contract Code —  
which may be seen as engaged in city planning rather than cartographic 
drafting.8
contratti in Europa: mediante o senza la legge?’, 39 Riv. di diritto civile 149 (1993, 
II); ID., ‘Pour un Code européen des contrats’, 91 Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 
707 (1992); ID., ‘Verso il tramonto del concetto di “obbligazione” nella prospettiva 
di un codice unico per l’Europa?’, 41 Riv. di diritto civile 203 (1995,1).
8 Whilst drafting the map is our immediate short-term concern, in the long run 
this experience may itself be part of the building of a common European legal cul­
ture. This task is shared by a number of projects, including the European Pro­




























































































Law casebooks. The idea o f shaping a truly common legal education has prompted 
some leading scholars in the field of comparative and European law to launch a 
project for the preparation of a series of casebooks on the common law of Europe. 
This project was first proposed during a conference organized at the University of 
Maastricht in 1991 on “The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Edu­
cation”. Among the members o f the steering committee are W. van Gerven, B. De 
Witte, T. Koopmans, and H. Kotz. The example of the United States has inspired 
this enterprise. In spite of the many marked differences among the laws of individual 
States, US legal education is based on a single national model which produces law­
yers able to move from State to State without insurmountable difficulties (see, e.g., 
Lawrence M. Friedman & Gunther Teubner, 3 ‘Legal Education and Legal Integra­
tion: European Hopes and American Experience’, in 1 Integration Through Law: 
Europe and the American Federal Experience, 345, 351 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. 
eds., 1986)). The authors o f the European casebooks project declare that it “wishes 
to uncover common general principles which are already present in the living law of 
the European countries... [besides,] rather than setting up a European law school, 
teaching materials are developed which can be used in such a law school, and in the 
curricula o f other law schools as well, and by courts looking for rules and principles 
to decide a case, throughout Europe” (W. van Gerven, ‘Casebooks for the common 
law of Europe: Presentation of the project’, 4 Eur. Rev. Private L. 67, 68 (1996)). 
This initiative displays important similarities with the common core project, in the 
sense that they both investigate the common features o f private law in the European 
national legal systems, but it is not their goal to impose new rules and categories. 
They both are analytical, not openly prescriptive. While this aim of developing cul­
ture is common to both the common core and to the casebooks approach, what ren­
ders them partially different is their target-audience. To begin with, the common 
core is aimed at scholars, while the European casebooks project is aimed at students. 
Producing suitable materials for didactic purposes implies that a careful choice must 




























































































3 The Common Core Approach in the European Context
Let me nOtV delve a little more deeply into the differences between 
the common core research project and the projects I have just men­
tioned: namely those which seek, in various ways, to achieve uniformity 
of law.9 This, hopefully, will cast sharper light on the methodological
derstand legal systems different from their own. Making this selection is the prov­
ince o f academics. In fact, the idea o f this group of scholars is to collect different 
materials in the form o f a “cases and materials” text, i.e. to use cases, legislation, but 
also legal doctrine materials, particularly in the form of short notes situating the 
other legal materials in their context. Ultimately, the goal is to provide students with 
a grasp o f foreign law whilst educating them as common European lawyers (the 
group has selected a number of subjects suitable for the study o f common core prin­
ciples: constitutional and administrative law, contracts, torts, conflict o f laws, com­
pany and economic law, criminal law and social law. The casebooks will mainly 
concentrate on the English, French and German systems, including materials from 
other European systems only if they provide original solutions. The first book pro­
duced with this method is W. Van Gerven et alii (eds.), Tort Law: Scope o f  Protec­
tion, Hart, Oxford, 1998). The common core project, too, may provide some useful 
materials for teaching purposes, but this is not its primary task. It investigates more 
specific areas o f law, delving deeply into technical problems. Moreover, it focuses 
on all European legal systems, avoiding - as with the other project - placing empha­
sis only on the areas which are or could be considered leading or paradigmatic. Nev­
ertheless, these are apparently differences o f degree and of timing rather than of na­
ture: it seems likely that the two enterprises will share many common features, and 
that they may well profit from each other.
9 For a description of the characteristics of different methods of attaining legal 




























































































and functional distinctions that characterize each initiative with respect 
to the others.
The “Lando Commission” and the “Unidroit Principles”.
There is no doubt that the use of the comparative method will reveal 
many common features that have remained obscure in traditional legal 
analysis, but this is because the instruments and techniques provide 
more accurate and correct analysis, not because they impose conver­
gence where this does not exist. Of course, more detailed knowledge 
may yield closer integration, so that common core research, too, may be 
considered as pushing indirectly towards more uniformity and less di­
versity.
It is also true that common core research may be a useful instrument 
for legal harmonisation, in the sense that it provides reliable data for use 
in devising new common solutions that may prove workable in practice.
tion, and Reform in International Commercial Law’, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 683 (1992); 
R. Zimmermann, ‘Roman Law and European Legal Unity’, in A. Hartkamp et alii 
(eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, Ars Aequi, 1998, 21; P.-Chr. Miiller-Graff, 
‘Private Law Unification by Means other than a Codification’, ibidem, 71; Olivier 
Remien, ‘Rechtseinheit ohne Einheitsgesetze’, 56 RabelsZ. 300 (1992); L. Moccia, 
‘Les bases culturelles du juriste européen: un point de vue continental’, in 49 Rev. 
Int. Dr. Comp. 799 (1997). On this issue cp. Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Non, oui, peut-être’, in 
Mélanges Christian Mouly 163 (1998); A. Gambaro, ‘Perspectives on the codifica­




























































































Nevertheless this has nothing to do with the common core research in 
itself, which endeavours to produce reliable information, whatever its 
policy application might be.
This is what constitutes the main difference between our project and 
any Restatement-like enterprise. The latter involves the pursuit of the 
ideals of rationality, harmony and reform, and this task entails selection 
of the legal rules and materials best suited to the task. That which does 
not fit in with the Restatement-like framework is discarded. This is 
anathema to an analytical perspective such as ours: the very fact that 
rules and materials exist in a legal system requires that they must be 
taken into consideration by the analysis and become part of the final 
map .
This also clarifies the distance between our research and the Lando 
project on the principles of European contract law, whose primary ob­
jective “is to serve as a basis for a European Code of Contracts. They 
are intended as a first step”.10 As Ole Lando himself explains, the prin­
ciples of European contract law differ from the American Restatement 
on Contracts because they require a more radical approach. They do not 
simply select from among several solutions extant in a single legal sys­
tem; because they must provide workable solutions for a widely diver-
10 Ole Lando, ‘Principles o f European Contract Law: An Alternative to or a Pre­
cursor o f European Legislation’, 40 Am J. Comp. L. 573, 577 (1992) (the article is 




























































































gent legal environment, they are designed to embody rules that do not 
exist as such in any European legal system.11
In spite of all these differences, however, the aims and the techniques 
of the two enterprises (Lando and the American Restatement) seem to 
be very much the same. They share the basic idea that they create new 
law (no matter how new it is with respect to the pre-existing legal situa­
tion), rather than simply analyzing the existing one.
This normative attitude is also shared by the Unidroit principles on 
international commercial contracts.12 These are meant to be soft (i.e., 
non-binding) law, and in this respect they are opposed to the idea of 
“political” codification. They seek to promote a uniform legal environ­
ment, not to impose it through legislative means. Their philosophy as­
sumes that differences among legal systems are so great that they would 
defeat any attempt to impose uniformity.
The characteristic of having recourse to persuasive authority is a fur­
ther feature shared by the principles of European contract law project,
11 Id., at 579; Id., Guest editorial: European contract law after the year 2000, 
CML Rev. 35, 821-831 (I), 1013 ss (II) (1998).
12 See Michael Joachim Bonell, ‘The Need and Possibilities o f a Codified Euro­
pean Contract Law’, 5 Eur. Rev. Private L. 505 (1997). “Harmonisation will occur 
for reasons exogenous to the law. Our efforts to draft unified laws are symptoms and 





























































































which, although meant to be finally embodied in a code, provides a 
common framework that functions as a set of legal guidelines.13
The choice of a soft-law approach, however, does not eliminate the 
prescriptive nature of these projects: changes to the existing law must be 
attained by indirect means, but the final aim is still legal change.
Thus, if  we are to sum up in one word the differences between the 
common core research and the common principles approach, that word 
might be “scepticism”.
The common core project, like the Cornell project, uses value scepti­
cism as its most important criterion: its aim is to provide as reliable and 
exact a picture as possible of the law existing in the European systems in 
a number of important areas. Whether this situation is legally efficient 
or rational is of no concern to the scholars involved. By way of contrast, 
the projects whose main task is to promote common solutions to legal 
problems must not only make a value-laden selection but are also inher­
ently imbedded in non-sceptical values, owing to the tension between 
uniformity and diversity. Such projects seek to ascertain, on the basis of
13 See Landò, supra, note 10, at 577-578, 584; C. Castronovo, ‘I “principi di 
diritto europeo dei contratti” e l’idea di codice’, 93(1) Riv. dir. comm. 21 ff. (1995). 
Compare K.D. Kerameus, ‘Problems of drafting a European Civil Code’, 5 Eur. Rev. 
Private L. 475 (1997); J. Basedow, ‘Un droit commun des contrats pour le Marché 
Commun’, 50 Rev. int. dr. comp. 7-28 (1998); ID., ‘A common law o f contracts for 
the Common Market’, 33 CML Rev. 1169-1195 (1996) See also Van Gerven, ‘ECJ 





























































































comparative research, which solution may best regulate certain legal 
problems in a common way, at the same time ignoring the possibility 
that core divergence may be justified on numerous grounds.
Moreover, normative projects are value-laden in another sense as 
well. Their choices cannot be made for nationalistic or chauvinistic rea­
sons (as they can be for a piece of politically supported legislation), but 
of course they must be defended on the grounds of general acceptability 
and rationality.
By this stage, lacking strong and full political legitimacy, these proj­
ects end up by advocating seemingly neutral ideas which have so far 
confined them within the narrow limits of areas of law in which no open 
value choices are or seem to be made (mainly contract law).14
14 Nevertheless, these areas cannot be neutral from the point o f view of values: 
the rules finally selected must be consistent with the values chosen as essential (or 
taken as a matter of course) by the participants, values which usually end up by cor­
responding to market ideology. Both the UNIDROIT principles and the first pub­
lished outcomes of the work of the LANDO commission attempt to avoid every po­
litical choice, while striving to maintain a neutral tone. In spite o f this, as made clear 
by studies on institutions (D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990; Furbotn-Richter, Neo-Institutional 
Economics, Michigan Univ. Press, 1997; O. Williamson, Organisation Theory: 
From Chester Barnard to the Future and Beyond, New York-Oxford, 1996), there is
t
no such thing as an institutional vacuum, because informal institutional arrange­
ments and the most pervasive of all institutions (often the Market) immediately fulfil 
whatever is not politically decided as a formal institutional choice. As a conse­




























































































The feature shared by the two kinds of enterprise (“common core re­
search” on -the one hand, “Lando” and “Unidroit” on the other) is their 
use of comparative methods. Yet this shared methodology serves di­
verging purposes, and consequently produces different results.15
4 Does History Matter?
The perspectives of scepticism and neutrality are also relevant when 
assessing the current debate on the feasibility and usefulness of a Euro­
pean civil code.16
There is strong disagreement among the expert participants in this de­
bate. Some of them maintain that a code is absolutely necessary in order 
to shape a truly common European law, while others believe that this 
project is not workable, either because the divergences among the na-
in favour o f the strongest market actor. On this see U. Mattei, ‘The Issue of Euro­
pean Civil Codification and Legal Scholarship. Biases, Strategies and Develop­
ments’, forthcoming in 21 Hastings L. J.
15 On the use o f comparative law in an international environment see Richard M. 
Buxbaum, ‘Die Rechtsvergleichung zwischen nationalem Staat und intemationaler 
Wirtschaft’, in 60 RabelsZ. 201 (1996); see also James Gordley, ‘Comparative Legal 
Research: Its Function in the Development of Harmonized Law’, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 
555 (1995); David Kennedy, ‘New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativ- 
ism and International Governance’, Utah L. Rev. (1997); U. Drobnig, ‘Scope and 
General Rules of a European Civil Code’, 5 Eur. Rev. Private L. 489 (1997).
16 On this point see e.g. Ewould Hondius, ‘Towards a European Civil Code: The 




























































































tional systems are still too strong (and this implies that the situation may 
change in the future, and a code may eventually be feasible), or because 
legal harmony can or must be achieved with means other than a code.17
In fact, many scholars argue that the principle of subsidiarity embod­
ied in the Treaty of Maastricht precludes such an action.18 The reference 
is to the principle which states that, in areas where the EU does not have 
exclusive powers (and private law is definitely one of them), the Union
17 On this debate see the contributions to the symposium ‘Towards a European 
Civil Code’ held in The Hague on February 28, 1997: in 5 Eur. Rev. Private L. 455 
(1997). Pierre Legrand, ‘Sens et non-sens d ’un code civil européen’, 48 Revue In­
ternational de Droit Comparé 779, 800-812 (1996); ID., ‘Against a European Civil 
Code’, 60 Mod. L. Rev. 44 (1997), strongly argues in favour of legal pluralism, 
which provides a wealth of solutions and techniques to ensure flexibility. See also 
Hugh Collins, ‘European Private Law and Cultural Identity o f States’, 3 Eur. Rev. 
Private L. 353 (1995); B. S. Markesinis, ‘Why a code is not the best way to advance 
the cause of European Legal Unity’ 5 Eur. Rev. Private L. 519 (1997); V. Zeno- 
Zencovich, ‘The “European Civil Code”, European Legal traditions and Neo- 
Positivism’, forthcoming 6 Eur. Rev. Private L. (1998); Hein Kotz, ‘Comparative 
Legal Research: Its Function in the Development o f Harmonised Law. The Euro­
pean Perspective’, in Towards Universal Laws - Trends in National, European and 
International Law-making, Uppsala, 1995; T. Weir, ‘Divergent Legal Systems in a 
Single Member States’, ZEuP 564-585 (1998).
18 Treaty on European union [TEU], art. B; EC Treaty, art. 3B; on the principle 
o f subsidiarity see G.A. Bermann, ‘Subsidiarity: Does it Have a Future?’ 26 Centro 
di studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero. Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari 
(M.J. Bonell ed.) 1993; A. G. Toth, ‘The Principle o f Subsidiarity in the Maastricht 




























































































may intervene only if the objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved 
through State action.
With regard to this debate, and whichever side one takes in address­
ing the issue of European Codification, one aspect which seems to be 
worth stressing, and which in any case should be kept in mind, is a 
methodological one.
Many scholars are currently engaged in a polemic that resembles in a 
somewhat vichian way the nineteenth-century dispute between Savigny 
and Thibaut on German codification. In the present debate, “Code” and 
“Culture” still appear to be perceived as antithetical and mutually exclu­
sive, as if enacted law could exist in modem Western societies without 
legal culture, and as if the two could ignore each other.19
This perceived opposition is similar to that between “top down” and 
“bottom up” reform. Indeed, if there is one lesson to be drawn from the 
experience of the Western legal tradition it is that the contrast between 
top-down and bottom-up legal change is a false opposition. All legal 
changes have aspects of both. Law is in part politics (top down) and in 
part culture (bottom up). Put otherwise, institutional change is due in 
part to invisible and in part to visible hand phenomena. It is partially the
19 The importance o f the role o f legal science in shaping the basis for a common 
law o f Europe is emphasized by Paolo Grossi, ‘Modelli storici e progetti attuali nella 




























































































local evolution of institutions, and partially the recognizable work of a 
political or professional élite.20
Consequently, on the one hand, creating a code does not cancel out 
the existence and the importance of other legal formants. Nor, on the 
other hand, is academic opposition to codification likely to be effective 
if there are the political conditions to do so (and certainly, even if effec­
tive, such opposition will not give scholars supremacy over Brussels bu­
reaucrats).
5 Legal Systems as Multi-Level Frameworks
There is another important issue to be emphasised when one is ex­
amining the feasibility of a European civil code. A cursory glance at the 
European Union law immediately reveals that it is a multi-level system.
Leaving aside the other legal formants —  for instance, the impact of 
scholarship on the preparation, drafting and application of European law 
—  we find treaties, directives (and the variety of transpositions by 
Member States), regulations, the implementation of these norms by na­
tional and sub-national administrative bodies, the enforcement of the 
rules by national courts, the supervising role played by the European 
Court of Justice, and so forth.21
20 See A lan W atson, e.g.: ‘C om parative L aw  and L egai C hange’, 37 Cambridge 
L. J. 313 (1978).
21 See L. A ntoniolli D eflorian, La struttura istituzionale del nuovo diritto co­




























































































We thus have different levels of elaboration, enactment, implementa­
tion, application, and enforcement of European rules. Moreover, there 
are citizens of some EU countries who are not subject to EU laws with 
which citizens of other countries must comply (because the legal sys­
tems of the former have not, or not yet, adopted EU rules that apply 
elsewhere). On the other hand, there are citizens of a given EU Member 
State who share only the core of a given EU legislation with the citizens 
of other States, since the statutory details, or the judicial interpretation, 
of the national provisions are very different in one State with respect to 
the other.
These features are very well known, and they are usually taken into 
consideration within the legal debate.22 By contrast, this debate seems to 
be much less aware of another phenomenon: the presence of a multi- 
level-legal-system is discernible not only at the European level but also 
within each national legal landscape.
22 See, e.g., the proceedings of the Workshop organised by C. Joerges and M.-J. 
Campana ‘Private Law Adjudication in the European Multi-level System’ (held at 
the European University Institute, Florence, 2-3 October 1998, forthcoming in EUI 
Working Papers series; C. Joerges, ‘European Challenges to Private Law: on False 
Dichotomies, True Conflicts and the Need for a Constitutional Perspective’, 18 Le­
gal Studies 146-166 (1998); ID., ‘Integration o f Private Law: Reductionist Percep­
tions, True Conflicts and an New Constitutional Perspective’, in C. Joerges & O. 
Gerstenberg (eds.), Private Governance, Democratic Constitutionalis and Suprana- 





























































































In saying this, I am not referring to Rodolfo Sacco’s very famous the­
ory of the dissociation of legal formants,23 but rather to a phenomenon 
which is today much more evident outside the Western tradition24 but 
nevertheless still at work in our legal systems as well.25 The reference is 
to the survival, or the re-birth, of different legal layers in which legal 
solutions and practices flourish alongside, or against, the “official law” 
to be found in judicial rulings or in the written codes and statutes.26
These legal layers coexist, serving different purposes, and some of 
them usually avoid the mechanism of formal adjudication, in the sense 
that most of the disputes arising between the users of a given layer are 
not settled by the “formal” circuit of adjudication. I include therein the 
bulk of the “alternative dispute resolution” mechanisms adopted in re-
23 On this theory see Rodolfo Sacco, supra, note 1.
24 See e.g. R. Sacco, Le grandi linee del sistema giuridico somalo (1985); ID. 
(with M. Guadagni, R. Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, L. Castellani), ‘Il diritto africano, in 
Trattato di diritto comparato’ (R. Sacco ed.) (1995); ID., ‘Mute Law’, 43 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 455 (1995); Doucet & Vanderlinden (eds.), La réception des systèmes ju ­
ridiques: implantation et destin, Bruxelles, 1994; M. Guadagni, Tl modello plural­
ista’, in 5 Sistemi giuridici comparati (A. Precida Mirabelli ed.) (1996) and ibidem, 
esp. pp. 3-20, further bibliographical references.
25 See e.g. Norbert Rouland, Aux confins du droit, Odile Jacob, 1991.
26 See e.g. Norbert Rouland, cit. supra, note 25 (also for the first references to the 
same phenomenon considered from the economic point o f view); Gunther Teubner, 
Law as an Autopoietic System, Blackwell, Oxford, UK-Cambridge, USA, 1993, 36 




























































































cent decades in many Western countries both in order to provide a just 
solution to certain kinds of legal conflicts which are hard to handle in 
the ordinary way, and to prevent people from deserting the congested 
ordinary justice system.27 The latter phenomenon indeed seems to me 
worth stressing as a symptomatic fact, because: (a) by signalling the 
possible differences in the supply and demand process in the “law mar­
ket”28 it provides further evidence of the phenomenon that I am trying to 
describe; and (b) it gives an example of the variety of tools available to 
official law-makers in order to create room for manoeuvre in handling 
socio-legal phenomena, or to build new “integrative” legal devices.
Staying with the stratification to which I refer, it may be briefly 
sketched as follows. The first layer one can detect is that controlled by 
customary rules and customary devices of adjudication —  rules and de­
vices grounded upon both ethical and sentimental values, and informed 
by the principle of “personal authority”. This seems to be a good repre­
sentation of areas such as family and kinsfolk relationships.
The second layer is also controlled by customary rules and customary 
devices of adjudication, but these rules and devices have, at least in part, 
different natures and grounds —  i.e.: traditional law, peacekeeping op-
27 On these mechanisms see, e multis, E. Grande & L. Nader, ‘Current Illusions 
and Delusions About Conflict Management’, forthcoming in W. Zartman, Tradi­
tional African Conflict Medicine (1999).





























































































portunism, trust in other people’s compliance with social rules. This 
seems to be so in the case of neighbourhood relationships, in the exer­
cise of property rights (mostly outside the urban context), of small value 
bargains, or of the usual settlement of disputes arising out of small acci­
dental injuries.29
Another layer is what we may call the “ordinary formal layer”, where 
most of human activities —  to which legal discourses usually refer —  
are located and where behaviour, entitlements and disputes are most fre­
quently controlled by the formal circuit of adjudication. Further to what 
was said earlier, it is worth remembering at this point that the “formal 
adjudication” has to be seen as the circuit which goes from authority- 
based rule (no matter whether local, national or transnational) to the en­
forced legal solution, via the various and different activities by all the 
legal actors of which the interpretive community consists.30
29 It is worth noting that the statement that the two layers just mentioned exist 
precisely because “formal” law allows them to do so, is based on a false premise. In 
the present context this set o f rules would indeed exist anyway and formal law has 
simply recognized them.
30 See e.g. M. Bussani, ‘Choix et défis de l’herméneutique juridique. Notes 
minimes’, in 50 Revue intemationale de droit compare 735 (1998); Id. (ed.), 
‘Diritto, Giustizia e Interpretazione’, in J. Derrida & G. Vattimo (eds.), Annuario 
fdosofico europeo (1998), where one can read contributions of G. Alpa, M. Barcel­
lona,, M. Bussani, J. Derrida, M. Ferraris, A. Gambaro, O. Gerstenberg, Duncan 




























































































I would add, to prevent any misunderstanding, that the two previous 
layers are also of course disciplined by “official” law and covered by the 
“formal circuit of adjudication”. The point is, however, that not only do 
statistics (which can even give us an interpretive hint of the reality) but 
also social perceptions and the day-to-day administration of law show 
that these are layers in which the relevant and direct source of the social 
order —  i.e. the historical task of the Law31 —  is something different 
from the “official” law and “formal” circuit.
The topmost layer is what we may call the “transnational business” 
one, where the substantive rules result from the customs of international 
commerce (the so called lex mercatoria) and where the business actors 
tend to adopt self-adjudication devices to settle disputes, and use their 
own judges and their own courts.32
6 The Autonomous Paths o f the Different Layers
Whatever target is pursued as regards European legal integration, if 
such integration is to be effective, and not merely wishful thinking, this 
stratification into different levels must be taken into consideration. The 
need to take account of the multi-level system appears self-evident if we 
are to be fully cognisant of the legal relationships we want to bring
31 The building and maintenance of which can be viewed as the traditional duty 
of jurists: see A. Gambaro, II successo del giurista, Foro Italiano, 1983, V, 85 ff.
32 And it is from this perspective that one may admire the effort o f UNIDROIT 




























































































about, or which are likely to be created, by a code or by any other 
authoritative regulation. Besides, such analysis seems necessary in order 
to understand what kind and level of integration to pursue, and also the 
correct.balance to strike between, on the one hand, reducing transaction 
costs and, on the other, adopting alternative options grounded on, for 
example, maintenance of the status quo, enactment of a few directives, 
providing some sort of Restatement, and so forth.33
Considering all this, however, also means bearing in mind that not all 
the layers of a stratified legal system are like clothes that can be worn or 
taken off as desired. Indeed, very few of them are. Once a layer has been 
put on, it cannot be removed completely. To refer to a paradox, it would 
be impossible for the French or the Italian “formal” legal systems to de­
cide overnight to become common law systems.
To be sure, in stratified legal systems, not all the layers have a degree 
of resistance comparable to that of the Civil Law tradition in France or 
the Common Law tradition in England.
33 The costs connected with the status quo are easy to specify: they take mainly 
the form of information costs. In a context where several legal systems may be in­
volved in any particular legal transaction, diversity creates unpredictability and re­
quires a specialized bar. As a consequence, a significant proportion of business re­
sources must be devoted to paying specialized practitioners to give transactional and 
litigation assistance, rather than being invested in wealth maximizing activities. On 
these points see U. Mattei, op. cit., supra, note 14; A. Gambaro, ‘Perspectives on the 
codification of law of property: an overview’, in 5(4) European Review o f Private 




























































































For instance, it is well known that the fourth layer (the “transnational 
business” one) is already strongly harmonized throughout Western legal 
systems.34
Besides, one might point out that during the last few decades the 
customary layer upon which family relationships are grounded has been 
converging rather strongly across legal systems, enabling individuals to 
accept almost instinctively the near-identical legislation being enacted 
within European countries.35 As far as the second customary layer is 
concerned, one could maintain either that it will witness the same con­
vergence, due to the widespread acceptance of shared values, or that the 
strength of historical roots and traditions affect the mentalité of indi­
viduals and lawyers in a way which makes it impossible to overcome by 
means of a “top down” effort towards integration.36
34 On (some of) the problems raised by the side effects o f this harmonization, see 
Ch. Joerges, ‘Disintegrative Effects o f Legislative Harmonisation: A Complex Issue 
and a Small Example’, paper presented at the Workshop ‘Private Law Adjudication 
in the European Multi-level System’, held at the European University Institute, Flor­
ence, 2-3 October 1998.
35 See e.g. Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Non, oui, peut-être’, cit. supra, note 9, at 165.
36 On this cp. e.g. P. Legrand, opp. cit. supra, note 17 and A. Gambaro, ‘Per­




























































































The point, however, is that —  as is made clear by historical and an­
thropological comparative legal studies37 —  for both of the above- 
mentioned layers, strongly embedded in customs, different values and 
traditions, any attempt at authoritative legal integration can only exist 
effectively through simultaneously adapting the extant rules to the new 
ones.
If one takes all this seriously, it will appear that it is only the third 
layer (which I called the “ordinary formal layer”, and which is, at the 
present time, the most State-centred one, and therefore the most resistant 
to spontaneous convergence) which is likely to be concretely affected, 
and indeed it is actually affected, by the current debate on the feasibility 
of European iegal integration by means of a code or through other 
authoritative legal instruments.38 In other words, it is on this layer that
37 See e.g.: Paolo Grossi, L ’ordine giuridico medievale (1996), passim; K. Von 
Benda-Beckmann, ‘Why Bother About Legal Pluralism? Analytical and Policy 
Questions: An Introductory Address’, in Commission on Folk Law and Legal Plu­
ralism, XXXLXNewsletter 1997, 14 ff.
38 It may happen that some of the legal routines on which the national “ordinary 
formal layer” is grounded cease to be perceived as optimal. Yet they are not 
changed, because the availability o f an alternative is simply ignored; because the 
costs of modifying the institutional setting are wrongly assessed; or simply because 
the incentives to change the institutional setting are wrongly allocated in the given 
circumstances. It is true, however, that due to the complexity of the legal system as 
an aggregate o f formal and informal institutions, every layer and every lawyer is 
fond of its/his own routine, and perceives a global change as inefficient or too com­




























































































the choice and the endeavour of an authoritative integration is most 
likely to have the greatest impact, within the not too distant future.39
Should this happen, the effectiveness of this integration will, in any 
event, be inevitably determined by the capacity to foster and control the 
growth of a common background for all lawyers, practitioners and 
scholars alike.
In order to ascertain the degree of integration, for example, it will be 
necessary to analyse the complex relationship between all the “legal 
formants” of the given systems, i.e. all the formative elements of the 
rules of law from amongst statutes, general propositions, particular defi­
nitions, reasons, holdings, and so forth. None of these formative ele­
ments will be necessarily congruous with each other within each system, 
or in comparison with the same formant at work in other systems; to put
demies, who do advocate some changes, usually in the domain of formal institu­
tions. But whenever one deals with the deeper aspects o f the legal framework (the 
aspects which shape and affect the lawyers’ mentalité) changes are feared, or even 
considered impossible. This is what makes the legal tradition, or as some might pre­
fer, the style o f a given legal system remarkably “path dependent”. On this see U. 
Mattei, op. cit., supra, note 14.
39 As far as a possible code is concerned, there is no doubt that a great deal de­
pends on the quality and the semantic level chosen by its drafters, on its capacity to 
codify common understandings, and on its ability to reflect the diversity o f the legal 
cultures that operate in Europe today. See A. Gambaro, ‘Codice Civile’, in Digesto 
IV, Civile, II, 1988, 442, 443 ff. Moreover, a European Civil Code would not solve 
the problem of the need for a European interpretive community: the former and the 




























































































forward the most trivial examples, Italian scholars and judges can di­
verge remarkably in responding to a given issue, as is also the case 
within German and French case law.
Moreover, in order to monitor the degree of integration achieved, it 
will be necessary to know not only how courts act but also to consider 
the influences to which the judges are subject in the given system. Such 
influences may arise because scholars have given wide support to a 
doctrinal innovation, but they may also concern the judge’s individual 
background —  a judge appointed from an academic position will tend to 
place more stress on scholarly opinion than a judge who has always 
practised law. The text of a national statute is one of these influences, 
even if previous judicial decisions have disregarded it, because there is 
always the possibility that courts will return to the letter of the local
• • 40statutory provision.
Moreover, this complex dynamic may change considerably from one 
legal system to another, in particular, a legal formant may lead in differ­
ent directions within each legal system, as well as from one area of the 
law to another.41
40 On all this see R. Sacco, op. cit. supra, note 1.
41 There are indeed a huge amount of problems raised by the fact that the very 
structure o f private law compels the “official law-makers”, and the interpreters as 
well, to vary the approach o f their integrative effort according to the needs of the 
different domains on which they focus. To provide some simple examples, it is ob­




























































































Thus, only awareness of those differences and of how they work, 
along with a full understanding of what the legal formants are and how 
they are related to each other, will enable us to ascertain the factors that 
affect the would-be “integrated” solutions, clarifying the influence of
tions) in which a combination o f legislative data, a glance at the case-law (and, if 
need be, some erudite reference to both the recent and distant history of law - ele­
ments whose permutation may vary from one side o f the Channel to the other) 
promises at the outset to be crucial to solving the problem. It is quite another matter 
to have to deal with topics in which any integration-concerned jurist must have an 
enormous variety of instruments and data at his disposal: topics such as administra­
tive law, for example; certain areas of property law, particularly as regards immov­
ables; special statutory law as, for instance, in the often confused legislation on resi­
dential rent control, or agricultural contracts (see A. Gambaro, 'Perspectives on the 
codification of the law o f property’, cit. supra, note 10). Similarly, the functioning of 
local Stock Exchanges and financial markets must be considered with reference to 
the fields o f corporation law, financial law, and security interests; fiscal law and 
contractual practices must be taken into account when considering new or “modem” 
contracts, and so forth. But the task is again different when one is dealing with parts 
o f the system in which even the closest attention paid to sources external to private 
law can make the solutions lie remote, not only from any integrative achievement, 
but from those very problems the law has been called upon to regulate. One can 
think, for example, o f the protection of the interests of subjects such as minors, the 
elderly, and the physically and mentally ill: indeed these are issues which cannot be 
considered without taking account o f the reality o f national and local institutions 
such as schools, hospitals, or workplaces, or the family planning clinics, or other so­
cial services, not to mention reformatories or jails. Cp. M. Bussani, ‘Choix et défis’, 




























































































interpretative practices (based on scholarly writings, on legal debate in­
spired by previous judicial decisions, etc.) in moulding actual outcomes.
7 Conclusions
A concluding summary of what I have so far tried to expound may be 
presented as follows. First, awareness of the existence of legal stratifi­
cations is a factor which confirms the reasonableness of adopting, as the 
methodological framework of the common core research, the factual ap­
proach and a question-and-answer methodology, requesting information 
on all the relevant elements that affect the legal solutions of the given 
case, including policy considerations, economic and social factors, so­
cial context and values, as well as the structure of the legal process (or­
ganization of courts, administrative structure, etc.).42
Secondly, knowledge of all the relevant elements and factors at play 
seems crucial in proposing European legal integration (by means of a 
code or otherwise) which aspires to go beyond the nationality and the 
personal agendas of the decision-makers involved in it.
Thirdly, the existing stratification of the legal systems calls for 
awareness of which law should be integrated or codified, and necessi­
tates a choice to be made in consequence.
Fourthly, any legal integration implies producing rules which are new 
for all, or at least for some, of the legal actors in the systems concerned.




























































































Implementation of such rules requires a class of interpreters —  judges, 
practitioners, scholars —  acquainted with the new rules and with their 
rationales. The absence of this knowledge in the short term, as well as 
(even in the long term) the strength of deeply rooted traditions in respect 
of different concepts, notions and their interrelations, may lead every 
“integrative” effort, not to mention a codification, to a dead end.43
Hence, certainly as far as European legal integration is concerned, the 
real issue seems to be the building of a common legal culture. This is an 
endeavour whose only tools appear to be a common legal education 
grounded upon knowledge of what is common and what is different 
among the different European systems.
After all, it remains beyond any doubt that in order to make a choice 
between pluralism and unity the first step is to gain reliable knowledge 
of what is at stake.
43 Or to a destiny not so dissimilar from that of many imported codes, the graves 
o f which fill the legal cemeteries o f many ex-colonized countries. See A. Gambaro, 






















































































































































































lus Commune Casebooks for thé Common Law o f  Europe 
Presentation, Progress, Rationale
Pierre Larouche*
1 History and aims o f  the Casebook Project
The Casebook Project was started in 1994 by Professor Walter van 
Gerven, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Universiteit Maastricht, 
who acts as General Editor, and Ms. Adriana Alvarez, Universiteit 
Maastricht, who is the Project Co-ordinator.'
* Researcher, Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law o f Europe, 
METRO Institute, Universiteit Maastricht. The author is a member of the Editorial 
Committee for the Casebook on Tort. Some of this report has been taken from the 
first work published in the course o f the Casebook Project: Tort Law: Scope o f  Pro­
tection (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), from documents prepared in connection 
with its launch, and from the presentation found at the home page o f the Project at 
<http://www.unimaas.nl/~casebook>. The opinions presented in the last part o f this 
report are however the author’s alone. This report was prepared for the Workshop on 
Private Law Adjudication in the European Multi-level System (Florence, 2-3 Octo­





























































































The Project aims to produce a collection of cases and other materials 
with accompanying notes, introductory comments and comparative 
overviews in each of the main fields of law. In the first phase 
(1996-2000) casebooks are to be prepared in the areas of Tort, Contract, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Company Law. These ar­
eas have been chosen because they belong to the core of private and 
public law, and because each of them illustrates to a varying degree the 
mutual influences between the legal systems of European Union Mem­
ber States, of the EU and of the ECHR.
A Steering Committee oversees the Project. For each casebook, an 
Editorial Committee has been brought together, made up of academics 
with an interest and experience in comparative law, coming from a 
number of legal systems.
2 Progress
Given that the concept was new, it took some time to elaborate an ap­
proach to the selection and presentation of materials, and develop 
working methods. These efforts resulted in the publication, in April 
1998, of the largest chapter of the Casebook on Tort as a stand-alone 
work, entitled Tort Law: Scope o f  Protection. This work constitutes both 
the general part of the Casebook on Tort and the precursor to the lus
1 For an early presentation of the project, see “Casebooks for the common law 





























































































Commune Casebook Series, setting out a formula for the presentation 
and the treatment of materials from multiple legal systems which the 
authors hope will be enriched and improved through use in the class­
room and elsewhere. The Casebook Project invites all users — students, 
academics, judges and practitioners — to make comments or sugges­
tions as to form or substance, particularly as to the length, or the ab­
sence, of treatment of one or another subject.
At this point in time, work is well underway towards the completion 
of tht mil Casebook on Tort as well as the Casebook on Contract, both 
of which are set to be published in the course of 1999. The other case­
books, on Judicial Review and Company Law, are also in preparation 
and should be available in 2000.
3 Tort Law: Scope o f  Protection
Co-authored by Professor Walter van Gerven, Mr. Jeremy Lever, QC 
(Oxford), Mr. Pierre Larouche, Professor Christian von Bar (Osnabrück) 
and Professor Geneviève Viney (Paris I), Tort Law: Scope o f  Protection 
sets out in a comparative fashion the extent to which civil liability is 
available as a form of redress, and outlines where and how general lim­
its to its realm are drawn. In addition to the genera! overview of tort law, 
the book covers acts and omissions; life, physical integrity, health and 
freedom; personality rights and privacy; ownership and property rights; 
economic interests; collective interests as well as unlawful conduct of 
public authorities. In so doing, it addresses many substantive issues in 
tort law, including recovery for nervous shock, liability for wrongful life 




























































































class actions, as well as liability for breaches of Community law. The 
book focuses on English, French and German law (with emphasis on the 
legal systems of other European countries where they show additional 
developments) and includes a substantial section on the influence of EU, 
ECHR and international law.
The casebook offers a selection of 125 documents, including the most 
relevant legislative provisions and leading cases from England (15), 
France (30), Germany (17), other countries (19) and suprana- 
tional/intemational courts (12), all in English, with a series of introduc­
tory notes, annotations and comparative overviews.
4 Experience with Tort Law: Scope o f  Protection and with the other
casebooks
a) Structure and selection o f materials
Given the differences between legal systems, structuring such case­
books is not without difficulties. Basically, two conflicting objectives 
must be reconciled. One is to respect as much as possible the identity 
and structure, the genius and style of each of the legal systems. The 
other objective is to make those systems comparable by identifying 
similar cases and issues (leading to similar or contrasting solutions and 
principles) within each legal system and then bringing them together so 
as to allow similarities and differences to appear. This tension is re­
flected in the choice of materials: the cases and other documents se­
lected should be “leading” in their respective systems, but on the other 




























































































the other systems, so as to enable comparisons to be made not only in 
the course of annotating the materials, but also directly on the basis of 
those materials themselves. It may be that the need to follow such a 
harmonised structure has led to a certain distortion in the categories and 
concepts that the various systems traditionally use, since certain ques­
tions which are central to some systems are not discussed at the same 
length in others, and accordingly must be “amplified” in the presentation 
of those other systems to enable comparison.2 Nevertheless, it is to be 
hoped that this has not occurred to the point where the characteristics of 
each system become unrecognisable.
As regards Tort Law: Scope o f  Protection, the very fact that such a 
chapter has been put together may already in and of itself be incompre­
hensible to scholars in the French legal tradition. For instance, the Code 
civil contains little if any a priori limits on the scope of protection, 
whereas in the BGB the principle of an exhaustive list of protected 
Rechtsgiiter is used, in §§ 823 ff. BGB and elsewhere in German tort 
law, to impose a limitation on liability claims. Moreover, although Eng­
lish common lawyers would not recognise the concept of “subjective 
rights” as such, many of the issues and solutions dealt with in Germany 
under the heading “protected rights” resemble those dealt with under the
2 For example, English and German law exhibit a reluctance to grant compen­
sation for pure economic loss and reiner Vermôgensschaden. French law does not 
appear to consider that pure economic loss should be treated differently from any 





























































































heading “duty of care” in England. The reason for this similarity is that 
both the German and English legal systems put emphasis on the neces­
sity to limit tort claims. They both try to achieve this by using restrictive 
concepts at the outset which, although different in name and structure, 
fulfil the same function and very often lead to comparable results. In 
contrast, French law does not appear to apply any concept at all to limit 
damages claims a priori, it seems deliberately to be aiming at the pro­
tection of plaintiffs against all kinds of socially unacceptable behaviour 
the injurious effects of which plaintiffs cannot be expected themselves 
to bear. Obviously, not all claims succeed under French law, but claims 
without merit tend to be rejected rather on the basis of the actual cir­
cumstances of the particular case than because of some a priori crite­
rion.
Further difficulties arose, for instance, whh the compartmentalisation 
of English law into a series of discrete torts, where the tort of negligence 
plays a leading role. Negligence is difficult to categorise because the 
standard of proximity or remoteness that determines the limits of liabil­
ity is defined, if at all, in relation to classes of persons and categories of 
behaviour,3 in a way that makes comparison with other legal systems ar­
duous, to say the least. Another source of problems was the relationship 
between private law and public law (ie State liability): there English law 
makes no distinction between the two realms and moreover ECJ case- 
law on State liability is likely to have consequences for the whole of tort




























































































law.4 Accordingly, State liability had to be part and parcel of the case­
book in respect of French and German law as well, in contrast with the 
approach generally followed in the latter two systems. Finally, matters 
were further complicated by the need to factor in the numerous regimes 
of liability not based on fault, which are usually presented in a frag­
mented fashion in each system.
b) Space constraints
At a more practical level, space constraints also confronted the 
authors with difficult decisions. It is obvious that the judgments of the 
highest courts, which form the bulk of the materials included in the 
casebook, convey a sense of their respective legal system not only 
through their substance, but also through the form of their reasoning. 
While a limited number of key judgments have been more generously 
excerpted so as to give the reader a feel for the mindset of the legal sys­
tem in question, it was unavoidable that Cour de cassation decisions 
would be presented without surrounding materials,5 House of Lords 
speeches without the lengthy statement of facts and review of relevant
4 See in particular ECJ, Judgment o f 19 November 1991, Joined Cases C-6/90 
and 9/90, Francovich v. Italy [1991] ECR 1-5357 and Judgment o f 5 March 1996, 
Joined Cases C-46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany [1996] ECR 
1-1029.





























































































case-law and BGH decisions without the full extent of the doctrinal con­
siderations found therein.
Electronic publishing offers a possibility to overcome space con­
straints, for instance by including full-text documents on a CD-ROM or 
on an Internet site. While users of the casebooks may thus have access 
to a larger range of materials, this does not obviate the need for exten­
sive editing of those materials in order to propose a manageable amount 
of “essential” reading for users who may not have the time or interest to 
read through all materials.
c) Language
Language was also a challenge, since the casebooks are entirely in 
English. Accordingly, all materials in other languages than English have 
been translated, and all notes and comments have been written in Eng­
lish, irrespective of the original language of the annotated materials.
As is well-known, translation of legal materials presents specific dif­
ficulties, because the passage from one language to another is coupled 
with the passage from one legal system to another. At this point in time 
in Europe, there is still no established “legal English” independent of the 
common law, which would enable a meaningful discussion of other le­
gal systems.6 Since the casebooks are not meant for the English- 
speaking market exclusively, but rather for Europe as a whole, the tradi-
6 The same could have been said of other languages, had another language been 




























































































tional solution, involving a translation of consecrated French or German 
legal terms either with a new English term or with a — sometimes fairly 
rough — equivalent in the common law, did not appear fully appropri­
ate. Indeed it could have left students from Continental countries 
guessing about a passage concerning their own system! Accordingly, 
non-English “keywords” were used fairly generously, firstly for the sake 
of conciseness,7 secondly in order to give users from non-English sys­
tems a sort of Aha-Erlebnis when reading about their own system in 
English and thirdly so that users from other systems have some indica­
tion of the keywords in the original language, should they want to pur­
sue further research. In practice, when these keywords were used for the 
first time, a note was included in the text to explain them to the reader, 
and specific indications were given in the subject-matter index in order 
to enable readers to find these explanatory notes quickly should they en­
counter the keyword again later. For instance, Vermögen or patrimoine 
was not translated and the explanatory note to Vermögen read:
The Vermögen is the set of all “assets”, i.e. all rights 
with an economic value (including ownership of real or 
personal property, money, contractual rights, etc.) relating 
to a particular person. The Vermögen corresponds to the 
patrimoine in French civil law. In common law terms, the 
Vermögen roughly corresponds to the estate.




























































































Furthermore, electronic publishing can be used advantageously here 
as well. In order to enable those who are familiar with the original lan­
guage of some or other materials, the original-language versions have 
been posted on the Internet.8 A French student can thus with the Internet 
read the French Cour de cassation judgments included in the casebook 
in French directly should he or she so desire.
5 Theoretical underpinnings and comparison with other projects
a) A “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” approach to the 
emerging common law o f Europe
The Casebook Project must be seen as a complement to other projects 
which endeavour to seek or set out the emerging common law of 
Europe. It follows a somewhat different route on the way to the discov­
ery of a common European legal heritage. Rather than seeking to draft 
model principles, the casebook project wishes to uncover common gen­
eral principles which are already present in the living law of the Euro­
pean countries, the European Union and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, as evidenced by legislation, case law and legal writing.
The Casebook Project therefore follows a “bottom-up” approach. This 
implies that the emergence of a common law of Europe, a new ius 
commune, should proceed through the progressive convergence of the 
legal systems. The casebooks put these systems together physically (un­
der one cover), for teaching purposes. It is hoped that this will seep into




























































































mentalities, so that students, academics, judges and practitioners will in­
creasingly thipk of national legal systems not in isolation anymore, but 
in relation to the other national legal systems and those of the EU and 
ECHR. A broad-based dialogue between legal systems, signs of which 
are already apparent in the decisions of the highest courts, should result. 
Indeed it can be argued that the convergence of European legal systems 
will only succeed if a critical mass of comparative- and European- 
minded jurists can translate and extend academic endeavours into the 
practical life of courts, law firms, business, organisations, etc.
Furthermore, the casebooks aim to demonstrate that a common law of 
Europe already exists in certain areas and is taking shape in others, 
thereby giving impetus to convergence. The Project therefore pursues a 
perhaps more difficult road to the Europeanisation of private law, but 
one which should ensure a solid basis.
b) A functional approach to comparative law
The Project takes a functional approach to comparative law, whereby 
the emphasis is put not so much on the difference between the various 
legal “families” or “cultures”, but rather on how the various legal sys­
tems cope with certain factual situations which are bound to happen in 
every system.9 Beyond exploring the actual outcomes reached by each
9 For instance, in the Casebook on Tort, it has been possible to include “cable” 
cases — where an excavation company typically cuts an electricity cable and forces 
a neighbouring plant to remain idle for a period of time — rescue cases, wrongful 




























































































system and the applicable “rules”, the casebooks also show the policy 
considerations which come into play. Indeed, law cannot be studied in a 
vacuum. While “legal cultures” may present certain differences, which 
come to bear in the mode of reasoning, the style, etc., it is the experi­
ence of the authors that policy considerations are shared to a greater ex­
tent than one suspects, and not necessarily along the traditional “fault 
lines” of “legal cultures”.10
Accordingly, the casebooks help to provide users with a broader per­
spective on law, where it is seen that factual situations, at the one end, 
and policy considerations, at the other, have an impact on law. Further­
more, the comparative perspective shows how various systems may 
have reacted similarly or differently to these factual and policy ele­
ments, and thus emphasises the contingency of the “rules” to be found in 
a given system at a given point in time.
c) Language
The decision to prepare the Casebooks in a single language, yet with 
extensive use of keywords from other languages,11 reflects a wish to
10 Policy considerations in tort law which are covered in the Casebook on Tort 
include, among others, the balance between the interests o f the victim and of the 
tortfeasor, the impact o f the constitutionalisation of certain interests such as life or 
freedom of expression, the hiérarchisation o f injury types, the — apparent — choice 
between fault or risk as a basis for liability, the use of general clauses as opposed to 
more detailed enactments, etc.




























































































take a balanced view. It is necessary to avoid the language of the Case­
books evolving into a form of meta-language that would be somehow 
related to each of the systems under study, yet foreign to them all. Con­
versely, the linguistic guidelines should not prevent the Casebooks from 
rising above each system and fulfilling their aim of laying the founda­
tion for the emergence of the common law of Europe.
Indeed, it could be argued that the Casebooks would have been truer 
to each legal system if materials had been left in the original language. 
Yet the Casebooks explore three legal systems in a sustained fashion, 
and more than fifteen others12 at some point or another, spreading over 
more than ten languages. From a strictly practical point of view, it was 
imperative to reduce the number of languages used in the Casebooks; 
using a single language would likely maximise the potential audience. 
English seemed a logical choice in the current European context, but it 
is to be hoped that the Casebooks can be translated into other languages 
as well, the important point being that the whole book remains in one 
language.
That choice of language cannot and should not be equated with a 
preference for the legal system(s) using that language. In fact, as was 
explained above, since the Casebooks are not meant only for an English- 
speaking common law audience, the English used in the Casebooks dif-
12 Legal systems of immediate relevance, such as Swiss law, as well as the North 
American legal systems are taken into account, in addition to the systems of EU 




























































































fers from the English used in the legal systems in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland.13 Nevertheless, it is certainly not the intention of the authors 
to develop a “new” language which would isolate the Casebooks from 
the legal systems studied therein. Rather, it is to be hoped that the Case­
books can contribute to reinforce the distinction between languages and 
legal systems, by showing that it is possible to have a meaningful com­
parative discussion of many legal systems without requiring a knowl­
edge of each of the languages in which these systems may be couched.14
d) Legal education
The Casebook Project could also have an impact on teaching. The 
case method has proven to be an extremely useful instrument in intro­
ducing students and scholars to a given field of the law. It is hoped that 
the casebooks will be used in various universities in different countries. 
This will present the additional advantage that academics and students
13 The extensive use o f foreign keywords is the most obvious difference, but 
some other commonly used terms are foreign to or rare in common law English, 
such as moveable/immovable, personality, absolute or relative rights, etc.
14 The discussion may perhaps not be as deep as in a work concerned with one 
legal system only (or in a comparative work where multi-lingualism is assumed). 
This could reflect either practical limitations in space or perhaps a more theoretical 
difficulty, whereby certain languages would enable a legal system to become so so­
phisticated that it becomes very difficult to explain it in another language. The ques­
tion then arises whether that difficulty denotes an inherent weakness in the com­





























































































from across Europe will study and discuss the same leading cases and 
materials. Ilf the long run, this may prove to be the most valuable contri­
bution of the casebooks towards the emergence of a common law of 
Europe. In addition, the need to present a number of legal systems 
within a limited amount of space15 and in a comparative fashion cannot 
but influence the approach to the subject matter. It is impossible to go 
into every detail of each system; instead, the materials and the notes 
must concentrate on the guiding principles and the policy choices that 
underlie each legal system. These constraints may actually prove to be a 
blessing. Indeed, it is submitted, the future of legal education may well 
lie in moving away from teaching the rules of law as they stand towards 
teaching the principle and policy framework behind the law, so that stu­
dents are better prepared to work in a dynamic and multi-system envi­
ronment.























































































































































































Bottom-up’ Harmonisation of European Private Law: 
lus Commune and Restatement
Christoph U. Schmid*
1 Introduction
‘The future of European private law is too important to be entirely left 
to the European institutions’. This motto of Christian v. Bar’s monu­
mental opus on the ‘Common European Law of Torts’1 may equally be 
considered as the basic concern of non-legislative or ‘bottom-up’ har­
monisation, which draws primarily on the harmonisation potential of the 
Europeanisation of legal science and education. Elaborating on this ap­
proach, this essay starts off from the current state of piecemeal legisla-
* EUI Florence and University o f Munich. I am grateful to Grâinne de Bürca and 
Christian Joerges for comments and critique. This contribution mainly draws on my 
essay “The emergence of a transnational legal science in Europe”, forthcoming in 
the Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies.
1 Christian v. Bar, Gemeineuropaisches Deliktsrecht, Erster Band: Die Kem- 
bereiche des Deliktsrechts, seine Angleichung in Europa und seine Einbettung in die 
Gesamtrechtsordnungen, Beck München (1996); English translation: The Common 




























































































tive harmonisation through EC-directives and its disintegrative conse­
quences. It then turns to the various strategies of legislative harmonisa­
tion, the most important one being the project for a ‘European Civil 
Code’, as called for twice already by the European Parliament. After ex­
amining the numerous disadvantages of this project, the essay’s focus 
shifts to the strategies of ‘bottom-up’ harmonisation, and expounds at 
some length on the ideas behind the lus Commune compilations recently 
published by Hein Kôtz, Christian v. Bar and Walter van Gerven. As a 
conclusion, the essay suggests a further development of ‘bottom-up’ 
harmonisation strategies, through the establishment of a European Law 
Institute and the compilation of specific ‘Mosaic-type’ Restatements of 
European private law.
2 Piecemeal Legislative Harmonisation and its Disintegrative Con­
sequences
The call for unification and harmonisation2 of private law within the 
EC has been voiced from the early years of the Community.3 However, 
while the Community’s activities in the sixties and seventies focused 
more on public and economic law, it is only since the beginning of the 
eighties that the European Commission has been engaged in harmonis-
2 The term ‘harmonisation’ will be used here to encompass all forms of the ap­
proximation of laws, including unification.
3 See the first president o f the EEC Commission, Walter Hallstein, in his fa­
mous article ‘Angleichung des Privat- und Prozeßrechts in der Europäischen 




























































































ing several classic fields of private law. Examples include the directives 
on commercial agents, product liability, doorstep-selling, consumer 
credit, package holidays and tours, unfair terms in consumer contracts, 
time sharing, and, most recently, delay in payment and consumer guar­
antees in sales.4 Yet these pieces of legislation are meant to fulfil spe­
cific economic, social or political goals in the overall process of market 
integration — precisely those which the competent Directorate General 
of the Commission has the duty to monitor. Therefore, the Directives are 
typically confined to rather small areas (what Hein Kotz called ‘legal 
pointillism’5), and their inherent logic is that they do not purport to pro­
vide an exhaustive regulation of core areas of private law, such as con­
tract or tort. EC law being directly applicable and enjoying supremacy 
over national law, the result is a partial overlapping of uncoordinated 
national, international and supranational layers of law which are rarely 
based on the same dogmatic structures, legal principles and socio­
political understandings. A similar situation is the juxtaposition, within 
the national legal order and often even within one and the same piece of
4 For a survey and more references see, among a true flood o f literature, U. 
Drobnig, Private Law in the European Union (1996); C. Quigley, EC Contract Law 
(1997); in German: Ch.-P. Müller-Graff (ed.) Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Eu­
ropäischen Gemeinschaft (1993); M. Gebauer, Grundfragen der Europäisierung des 
Privatrechts (1998); I. Klauer, Die Europäisierung des Privatrechts (1998); S. 
Grundmann, Europäisches Schuldvertragsrecht (1999); in Italian: N. Lipari (ed.), 
Diritto Privato Europeo, 2 voi. (1997).
5 ‘Gemeineuropäisches Privatrecht’, in H. Kötz et al. (eds), Festschrift fur Kon­




























































































national legislation, of provisions of purely national origin and provi­
sions which have the function of implementing European law and, fol­
lowing the ECJ’s famous doctrine of interprétation conforme, must be 
interpreted in line with the latter6 These problems are further aggra­
vated by the fact that different pieces of EC legislation are not always 
consistent with each other and that, generally speaking, their quality is 
often not convincing.7 As a result, private law in Europe may be said to 
have to serve “two masters”,8 the competences of which are not clearly 
delimited, as is the case for federal systems such as the German one. 
This constellation has been called a multi-level system or — more ap­
propriately, since the term ‘system’ is generally reserved for unitary and
6 See M. Lutter, ‘Die Auslegung angeglichenen Rechts’ 1.1992) 47 Juristenzei­
tung 593.
7 Thus, there is often no substantive coherence among various directives (e g. 
there is no unitary concept o f a consumer, but different directives contain different 
definitions; the conflicts o f law rules o f several directives are not in harmony with 
the 1980 Rome convention), and academic, in particular comparative, research is 
often simply not taken into account. See as to these and other defects o f private law 
directives H. J. Sonnenberger, ‘Der Ruf unserer Zeit nach einer europäischen Ord­
nung des Zivilrechts’ (1998) 53 Juristenzeitung 984 as well as E.-M. Kieninger and 
S. Leible, ‘Plädoyer für einen “Europäischen wisschenschaftlicher Ausschuß für 
Privatrecht’” (1999) 9 Europäische Zeitschriftfiir Wirtschaftsrecht 37.
8 For the unfeasibility o f a legal order serving two masters (i.e. two Grundnor- 
men), see Kelsen’s famous quote from Matthew VI, 24 in Reine Rechtslehre (in 




























































































coherent orders — regime.9 Therein, national private law may clash with 
pieces of EC private law (“vertical conflicts”) or with any other 
branches of the EC legal order such as, in particular, the basic freedoms 
or competition law (“diagonal conflicts”).10 Such conflicts are at times 
even difficult to detect, let alone to resolve, and therefore may lead to 
chaotic situations.11 It is obvious that, under these conditions, the value 
of a (relatively) coherent and harmonious system as a methodological
9 An instructive summary of the various features o f the multi-level regime may 
be found in O. Remien, ‘Einheit, Mehrstufigkeit und Flexibilität im europäischen 
Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht’ (1998) 62 Rabelszeitschrift 627.
10 On this notion see C. Schmid, ‘Vertical and diagonal conflicts in the Europe­
anisation process’ in C. Joerges and O. Gerstenberg (eds), Private governance, 
democratic constitutionalism and supranationalism (European Commission, 1998), 
185.
11 One o f many examples is the intractable question of the compatibility of Art. 9 
of the second company law directive on the extent o f a representative’s power to 
bind his company on the one hand and national constructs such as the German doc­
trine on ‘Mißbrauch der Vertretungsmacht’ or the Common Law ‘ultra vires’ doc­
trine on the other. This question was decided by the ECJ on the reference of the 
Dutch Hoge Raad in Case C-104/96 (Rabobank). However, the German Bundes­
gerichtshof had in 1985 rendered a judgment on the identical facts without even rec­
ognising the problem of compatibility o f the corresponding German provisions with 
the directive. See C. Schmid, ‘Die gemeinschaftsrechtliche Überlagerung der Tat­






























































































paradigm in Civil Law diminishes.12 Although Common Law is proba­
bly more accustomed to legal fragmentation and the overlapping of dif­
ferent layers of law, the “two masters” constellation creates problems 
even there, since coherence between the various sources can no longer 
be established by the national legal order and the national legal commu­
nity.13
3 Strategies o f  Legislative Harmonisation
As a response to this kind of legal disintegration and fragmentation, 
and more generally in order to provide businesses and citizens with a 
uniform and more transparent legal infrastructure, several leading schol­
ars have, for quite some time now, called for greater legislative unifica­
tion of private law at the European level.14 Three basic options have 
been distinguished: a European Sonderrecht (special regime) for trans-
12 The German classic on the ‘system’ as a methodological paradigm is C.-W. 
Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz, 2nd. ed. (1983). Im­
plications o f the European regime for national systems are described in C. Schmid, 
‘Europäische Integration und Privatrecht’, forthcoming in JURA.
13 When comparing this constellation to the former classic distinction between 
law and equity (when both were still applied by different courts), it should be noted 
at least that the ambits o f application of European and national private law are far 
less clearly delimited than legal and equitable remedies.
u  For instructive summaries o f the various possibilities see Sonnenberger, supra 
note 5, and J. Basedow, ‘The renascence o f uniform law: European contract law and 




























































































border relationships among private parties only; a core of common 
European principles to be implemented by national private laws; and, 
most ambitiously and importantly, the elaboration of a European Civil 
Code.15 The last option has been called for twice, in 198916 and 1994,17
15 O. Landò, ‘Unfair Contract Clauses and a European Uniform Commercial 
Code’ in M. Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives for a Common Law o f Europe (re­
ports from the symposium inaugurating the European University Institute at the Ba­
dia Fiesolana in 1976) (1978). Later contributions include G. Gandolfi, ‘Per un con- 
dice europeo dei contratti’ (1991) 45 Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 
781 (in French: ‘Pour un code européen des contrats’ (1992) 91 Revue trimestrielle 
de droit civil 707); W. Tilman in Müller-Graff (ed.), supra note 3, 485; A.S. Hart- 
kamp, M.W. Hesselink, E. H. Hondius, J.B.M. Franken (eds), Towards a European 
Civil Code, 1st ed. (1994), 2nd ed. (1998) with new contributions; J. Basedow, ‘A 
Common Contract Law for the Common Market’ (1996) 33 CML.Rev. 1169; O. 
Landò, ‘Making a European Private Law’ in K. F. Kreuzer, D. H. Scheuing, U. Sie­
ber (eds), Die Europäisierung der mitgliedstaatlichen Rechtsordnungen in der Eu­
ropäischen Union (1997), and the conference proceedings on ‘Towards a European 
Civil Code: the debate has started’, published in the European Review o f Private 
Law voi. 5 no. 4; and Vers un Code européen de la consommation: codification, 
unification et harmonisation du droi des Etats membres de V Union Européenne 
(1998); for a survey of current French literature see also A. Chamboredon, ‘Le débat 
sur le code civil européen: pour une “texture ouverte’” , EUI Paper 1999 (on file with 
author).
16 Resolution on Action to Bring into Line the Private Law of the Member 
States, [1989] O.J. C 158/400.
17 Resolution on the Harmonisation of Certain Sectors o f the Private Law of the 




























































































by the European Parliament. Yet the codification project appears to be 
not only extremely controversial, but also rather unrealistic for a number 
of normative and practical reasons.18 First, the jurisdiction of the EC in 
respect of the subject matter in the traditional fields covered by civil 
codes is by no means clear, in particular in areas unrelated to a market 
rationale.19 Thus, whilst contract and commercial law harmonisation 
might nevertheless be covered by EC competence, tort law is very likely 
to be a problematic case, and matters largely influenced by national 
culture, such as family law or the law of succession, should be com­
pletely outside the European legislator’s sphere. However, the subsidi-
18 See the numerous criticisms from various perspectives: O. Kahn-Freund, 
‘Common Law and Civil Law - Imaginary and Real Obstacles to Assimilation’ in 
M. Cappelletti (ed.), supra note 15, 137; B. Markesinis, ‘Why a code is not the best 
way to advance the cause o f European legal unity”  (1997) 5 ERPL 519; M. J. 
Bonell, ‘The need and possibilities of a codified European contract law’ (1997) 5 
ERPL 505; P. Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (1997) 60 MLR 44; G. 
Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up 
in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 MLR 11; H. Collins, ‘European Private Law and the 
Cultural Identity o f States’ (1995) 3 ERPL 353; on the latter topic see also J. Base­
dow, ‘Rechtskultur - zwischen nationalem Mythos und europäischem Ideal’ (1996) 
5 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 379. For an earlier instructive summary of 
arguments pro and contra codification, see O. Remien, ‘Denationalisierung des Pri­
vatrechts in der Europäischen Union? - Legislative und gerichtliche Wege’ (1995) 
35 Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung 116 at 119 et seq., with rich references from 
all European countries.





























































































arity principle, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, might even stand in 
the way of a European Code of Contracts, and a high-ranking European 
Commission official has indeed stated that no codification efforts are 
being contemplated by Brussels at the present time precisely for this 
reason.20 But even if this principle were interpreted differently in the 
future or if the EC were actually endowed with more competences 
(which seems hardly realistic at the present time), it is not at all clear 
that the economic cost of a code would outweigh its benefits.21 In par­
ticular, it should be borne in mind that international economic actors 
have already created for themselves flexible legal instruments and pro­
cedures to deal with international contracts which seem to suit their 
needs well, such as standard forms and arbitration.22 But even if it could 
be proven that more unification is actually needed in certain fields of 
private law, the difficulties of agreeing on novel uniform substantive 
law structures and concepts in traditional fields of private law, and of 
abolishing the existing national ones would seem to be enormous. Be­
yond that, the differences in legal style, reasoning, culture and education 
are anything but small — not only between Common and Civil Law — 
and they might even make it impossible for national courts to apply a 
code, if it were actually enacted, uniformly. To prevent such a scenario,
20 J. T im m erm anns, ‘Z u r E ntw icklung des europäischen Z iv ilrech ts’ (1999) 7 
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 1 at 4.
21 See U . M attei, ‘A  transaction  cost approach to the E uropean C ode’ (1997) 5 
ERPL 537.




























































































a code would probably need to be monitored by a considerably up­
graded European court system which, in turn, would also render neces­
sary a profound reorganisation of the national court system. Finally and 
perhaps most importantly, it should not be overlooked that large parts of 
private law are embedded in still sensibly different national cultural, so­
cial and economic conditions which find their expression also in differ­
ent public and constitutional law systems (the so-called “constitutionali- 
sation” of private law).23 Just as in the case of many existing pieces of 
EC legislation, a uniform code and a European judiciary could hardly do 
justice to all of them and, therefore, their imposition “from above” 
might be met with considerable resistance by the European people.
In view of these powerful arguments against legislative harmonisa­
tion, it seems to be worthwhile to examine the potential shown by 
strategies of non-legislative harmonisation.
4 ‘Principles o f European Contract Law’ and Ius Com m une Com­
pilations
As an alternative to greater legislative unification at this moment in 
time, but also with the aim of putting the existing ‘pointilistic projects’
23 An illuminating account o f the complexities o f the constitutional embedded­
ness o f private law in the European multi-level system of governance was presented 
by C. Joerges in ‘European Challenges to Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, 
True Conflicts and a New Constitutionalist Perspective’ (1997) 3 E U  378 = (1998) 
18 LS  146, with an annotation by G. Samuels, ‘The impact o f European integration 




























































































of EC legislation into an overall framework and of preparing a common 
ground for-future harmonisation efforts, other noted scholars have, since 
the beginning of the eighties, suggested alternative “bottom-up” ap­
proaches24 i.e. through non-legislative preparatory work undertaken by 
legal scholars and practitioners in order to bring European legal systems 
closer together.25 One such strategy relies on the potential for indirect 
harmonisation of a restatement of ‘Principles of European Contract 
Law’. A compilation thus entitled was first presented in 199526 and has 
been re-issued in 1998 by the Lando Commission (named after its ini­
tiator and chairman, the well-known Danish professor Ole Lando). Con­
fined to the more technical issues of contract law, this restatement is 
elaborated on a comparative law basis and consists, just as its American 
predecessors, of rules, illustrations and comments. Thus, the Principles 
try to show what a future code might look like and to provide a starting 
point for future debates.
24 The expression seems to have been coined by F. Hayek, Law, Legislation and 
Liberty, 2 vol. (1973 and 1976).
25 In general see the contributions in B. De Witte and C. Forder (eds), The com­
mon law o f Europe and the future o f legal education (1992); with respect to private 
law harmonisation see also P.-Ch. Milller-Graff, ‘Private Law Unification by Means 
other than of Codification’ in A.S. Hartkamp, M.W. Hesselink, E. H. Hondius, 
J.B.M. Franken (eds), supra note 15 at 19; O. Remien, ‘Rechtseinheit ohne Einheits- 
gesetze?’ (1992) 56 Rabelszeitschrift 300.
26 O. Lando and H. Beale (eds), Principles o f European Contract Law, 1995 




























































































Another strategy, more basic but probably even more important, relies 
on the harmonisation potential of the Europeanisation of legal science 
and education through comparative synoptic compilations of what might 
become a new Common Law of Europe. It is based on the conviction 
that just as economists and politicians have been doing for some time, 
lawyers, too, should be encouraged to think in European and interna­
tional terms. Thus, mutual observation and understanding might be fur­
thered, social and economical commonalties and differences particular­
ised, and legal concepts, legal reasoning and legal culture assimilated. 
The ultimate aim of this project is said to be the gradual reconstitution 
of a common approach to and a common vision of private law, which 
actually existed from the period of the reception of Roman Law until the 
eighteenth century, but was lost with the emergence of the European 
nation states and the enactment of national codifications.27
Three ius commune books have already been published: European 
Contract Law by Hein Kotz,28 The Common European Law o f  Torts, by 
Christian von Bar29 and, as the first book of a forthcoming series of Ius 
Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe, Cases, Materials
27 See R. Zimmermann, ‘Civil Code and Civil Law: The “Europeanisation” of 
Private Law within the European Community and the Re-emergence of a European 
Legal Science’ (1994/95) 1 Columbia Journal o f  European Law  63.
28 Vol. 1: Formation, Validity and Content o f Contracts; Contracts and Third 
Parties, English translation by Tony Weir. Clarendon Press, 1997.




























































































and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law: Scope 
o f  Protection by Walter van Gerven, Jeremy Lever, Pierre Larouche, 
Christian von Bar and Geneviève Viney.30 These books represent the 
first attempts at compiling, in the classical fields of contract and tort, the 
foundations of a new European Common Law. Adopting a comparative 
functional perspective, informed by the historical genesis and the social 
and economic tasks of private law, they bring to light the many already 
existing common features of national laws in Europe which are mostly 
hidden behind different conceptual and technical frameworks. Existing 
substantive differences are only criticised if they entail an inferior stan­
dard of protection for citizens as compared to other laws — but never on 
the sole ground that they constitute minority solutions or simply obsta­
cles to uniformity. Thus, the approach of these books may indeed be 
said to “strengthen the common legal heritage of Europe, not to strangle 
its diversity”.31
To give a better impression of the ius commune approach, the basic 
conceptual structure of ‘European Contract Law’ by Hein Kôtz will be 
briefly examined. This book covers the ‘general’ law of contracts, i.e. 
the fields of formation, validity, and content of contracts as well as the 
area of contracts and third parties. It describes the institutions of con­
tract law, structured on a functional basis, in the form of general Euro­
pean “synoptic reports” supplemented by personal comments. Cases and
30 Hart Publishing, 1998.




























































































quotations from legislative materials, including supranational and inter­
national law (in particular the UN sales law convention), are mainly 
relegated to the footnotes. This method of presentation reflects the 
book’s general approach that the positive rules of the various countries 
should be regarded only as local variants of the contract law of Europe 
as a whole. Only exceptionally, in fields in which greater differences 
were found, does the text provide for “national reports” before reverting 
to the common European ground; examples include the French jurispru­
dence on indétermination du prix, German law on culpa in contrahendo 
and English law on the avoidance of contracts for undue influence or 
misrepresentation. This presentation of contract law institutions is also 
meant to be a way of testing the effectiveness of national legislative and 
doctrinal constructs: the only concepts, structures and institutions which 
deserve to survive are those that pass “the acid test of international dis­
cussion”.32 Two examples may briefly demonstrate how largely com­
mon European solutions are worked out or, if incompatible with existing 
law, at least suggested by this book.
In the section on liability for breaking off negotiations (p. 34ff), we learn that 
despite the Common Law’s categorical denial o f a duty to deal in good faith or of 
a special precontractual relationship of trust such as culpa in contrahendo (which
32 This idea has been taken up by J. Smits in ‘A European Private Law as a 
Mixed Legal System’ (1998) 5 Maastricht Journal o f Comparative and European 
Law 328. This author advocates the development o f a new ius commune through the 
“free movement of legal rules”. However, apart from a reference to the books re­
viewed here, he does not make clear what kind of instruments he has in mind in or­




























































































is often presented as one of the most striking differences with respect to the con­
tinental systems), the Common Law does in reality also protect the parties’ le­
gitimate interests in the negotiation of a contract. This is achieved, inter alia,33 
through the extension of the tort o f negligence, which also allows compensation 
for pure economic loss, up to the negotiation phase (the leading case being Hed- 
ley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners [1964] AC 465). In addition, it is shown 
that even the latest controversial case in which the House of Lords has again de­
nied the existence of such a duty, Walford v. Miles ([1992] 2 AC 128) would very 
probably have been decided in the same way by a French or a German court. In 
this case, the plaintiff failed to obtain what is called in German law the ‘perform­
ance interest’ (ErfUllungsinteresse) for the failed conclusion o f a contract; i.e. the 
economic advantage he would have gained had the contract been concluded and 
performed. This kind o f compensation is however only exceptionally awarded by 
continental courts where, prior to the collapse of negotiations, the contract was 
confidently anticipated. The rule is that a party guilty o f culpable conduct during 
negotiations must only put the other party in the position he would have enjoyed 
but for such conduct (the so-called ‘reliance interest’ — Vertrauensinteresse). 
Because of the availability o f this more sophisticated distinction between proper 
and improper conduct in negotiations, so the author convincingly concludes, the 
House of Lord’s rather wholesale dogmatic reasoning exclusively based on the 
non-existence of a duty to negotiate in good faith is unpersuasive. That notwith­
standing, the fact that the scope of protection under English tort law was extended 
to the negotiation phase and that continental and English courts would both have 
denied the ‘performance interest’ in Walford v. Miles might suggest that at least a 
limited common European law with regard to sanctions for improperly breaking 
off negotiations might be argued to exist.
33 For other (American) Common Law equivalents o f culpa in contrahendo see 
C. Schmid, Das Zusammenspiel von Einheitlichem Kaufrecht und nationalem Recht: 




























































































Another example: under the functional label of ‘tests o f earnestness’ (to be 
found also in Zweigert and Kotz’ famous Introduction to Comparative Law), 
chapter 4 deals with different legal constructs which are meant to ensure that 
where the promisor seriously undertook a contractual obligation, the law should 
enforce it. German law, on the one hand, extended the Roman law model o f ‘con­
sensual contracts’, i.e. an obligation coming into existence through consensus 
only, to any ordinary contract. On the other hand, French, Italian and Spanish law 
insist on ‘cause’, English law on ‘consideration’ as additional conditions of “ear­
nestness”. However, ‘cause’ is argued to be a merely conclusory and therefore 
largely superfluous formula which makes no contribution to the proper grounds 
for reaching the conclusion: as a validity requirement, cause is used only when 
French courts hold a contract invalid as being contrary to good morals or ordre 
public. ‘Absence de cause ’, on the other hand, refers to the counterperformance 
and means that this has no economic value for the other party who, as a conse­
quence, need not submit to the contract. In this sense, ‘cause’ only restates the 
conclusion of a risk allocation assessment or that o f invalidity by reason of deceit 
or mutual mistake (p. 56). By contrast, the doctrine of consideration is not a hol­
low formula, but means that a promise is generally binding and enforceable only 
if it is made in view of some sort o f counterperformance by the promisee. How­
ever, the use o f the concept in a set o f special cases has been widely criticised in 
English academic literature (p. 760: when the counterperformance is ‘inadequate’ 
or even only ‘nominal’ (the famous peppercorn may be sufficient); when the 
doctrine is relied upon to challenge the validity of an agreement in favour o f one 
of the parties; when it leads to the denial of validity to a perfectly reasonable 
agreement to grant a right to a third party; finally, when it allows the revocation 
of an offer which was declared to remain open for acceptance for a stated period 
of time. The consequence of this analysis, even though not explicitly stated by the 
author, seems to be that neither the concept o f cause nor the criticised features of 




























































































5 The next step: A European Law Institute and ‘Mosaic-
Restatements'?
Evaluating the current stage of non-legislative harmonisation, one 
may indeed say that it is the great merit of the ius commune books to 
have unveiled a common European acquis in private law whose scope is 
wider than many might have expected. This leads us to the issue of how 
this acquis could be rendered useful for further harmonisation of Euro­
pean private law. This issue is of course a complex and a highly specu­
lative one, and it may only be briefly addressed in the present context.34
Three points seem to be crucial. First, whilst the idea of harmonisa­
tion “from below” seems to be the more promising option, the ius com­
mune projects are only the first step in this direction. In particular, it 
would be premature to think that a growing awareness by lawyers of 
existing commonalties and the discursive competition among norms 
might overcome all the objections against codification mentioned above. 
This means that rather than striving for more legislative harmonisation 
at the present time, more advanced methods of ‘harmonisation from be­
low’, building on the common European acquis in private law, should 
be designed. Second, in doing so, one should bear in mind that com­
parative law provides only one component of the common private law
34 For a detailed account see C. Schmid, ‘Plädoyer für ein Europäisches Recht­
sinstitut und für Restatements über Europäisches Recht’ forthcoming in T. Acker­




























































































acquis35 Therefore, further harmonisation efforts cannot realistically ig­
nore, but should rather build on, all the components of the multi-level 
regime; they should in particular integrate the existing pieces of supra­
national and international legislation as well as the conflict of laws 
problems, into interconnecting different legal levels. As well illustrated 
in van Gerven’s book, such efforts should integrate European law, con­
flict of laws and comparative law perspectives alike. Last but not least, 
practical concerns should be addressed. For further progress in ‘har­
monisation from below’ may be presumed to depend crucially on the 
way it is technically organised, and it is becoming more and more obvi­
ous that the Commission has neither the political force nor the personnel 
and financial resources to develop and implement a coherent overall 
concept of European private law. More realistically than any institu­
tional reforms at EC level, one might think of private initiatives of the 
European legal profession assisting the Commission in this task.
The inspiration one might draw from these provisos is that a sort of 
European counterpart of the American Law Institute, designing Re- 
statement-like compilations of European private law, could be of great 
use.36 Apart from minor, but very useful activities,37 a European Law In-
35 Similarly recently Basedow, supra note 13 at 138 et seq.
36 Such a proposal has already been made with respect to company law harmoni­
sation by Werner F. Ebke (who is a foreign member o f the AIL) in ‘Company law 
and the European Union: Centralised versus Decentralised Lawmaking (1997) 31 
lnt. Law. 961 at 985; idem., ‘Untemehmensrechtsangleichung in der Europäischen 




























































































stitute could provide a suitable institutional framework for fertile co­
operation with the Commission. For this purpose, it could assemble sci­
entific committees in various fields of private law which, as already 
happens in regulator law,38 could assist in the drafting of European 
legislation.39 Furthermore, a European Law Institute could arrange for 
the elaboration of Restatement-like compilations of entire fields of 
European private law. Two caveats should, however, be expressed here. 
First, in the EC context, the term ‘Restatement’ would indicate only the 
form of a compilation, composed of rules, comments and illustrations;
Festschrift für Bernhard Großfeld (1999) 189; with respect to European primary law 
consolidation by C. Schmid, ‘Konsolidierung und Vereinfachung des europäischen 
Primärrechts - wissenschaftliche Modelle, aktueller Stand und Perspektiven’ in A. v. 
Bogdandy and C.-D. Ehlermann (eds.), Konsolidierung und Kohärenz des Primär­
rechts nach Amsterdam (1998), Europarecht, supplement 2, 17 at 34 et seq.; an en­
hanced English version is available as EUI Working Paper, Robert Schumann Cen­
tre, No. 7/99, http://www.iue.it.PUB).
37 Examples would include: elaborating a model o f uniform quotation for aca­
demic literature (such as the “bluebook” edited by major American universities), or­
ganising exchanges, conferences and educational and vocational training of lawyers, 
gathering information on national legal systems and court decisions, co-ordinating 
the activities o f the various ongoing academic research projects.
38 See e.g. in foodstuff law C. Joerges and H.-J. Neyer (1997) 3 E U  273, stress­
ing also the deliberative democratic potential o f transnational committees.
39 A “European Scientific Committee for Private Law” in order to assist the 
Commission in the drafting of new EC legislation was recently proposed by 




























































































in substance, a European Restatement could not be a mere abstraction 
and clarification of the case law in a particular field like its American 
counterparts. Second, a European Restatement should not be a novel 
comparative law creation such as the Lando principles either; for such a 
device mainly adds a further new element in the already complex picture 
of European private law. Rather, it should be a compilation, building to 
the greatest possible extent on the existing common European acquis in 
private law — in other words, it could be described as a “mosaic-type 
Restatement” trying to put together the existing pieces of European and 
international legislation in the private law field, thus reconciling a com­
parative with a European law perspective. Such a compilation could 
benefit from the fact that, taken together, the UN sales law convention 
(to which all EC Member States except the UK are parties),40 EC direc­
tives and regulations, substantive law implications of the 1968 Brussels 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention and of the ECJ’s jurispru­
dence on tort law and restitution (as examined by van Gerven), as well 
as general principles developed by the ECJ, already cover many impor­
tant fields of private law. Thus, the attempt might be made to rearrange 
these sources systematically, into one coherent document. Its basic 
structure might follow the model of the UN sales law in contract law; an 
attempt might be made to compose a tort law structure out of EC direc­
tives, ECJ jurisprudence and common elements of national laws as de­
scribed by the ius commune compilations. The, certainly numerous, gaps
40 See on this the leading commentary by E. v. Caemmerer and P. Schlechtriem 




























































































could equally be filled to the largest possible extent with common or 
similar national rules and, if such do not exist, with those national solu­
tions which find most acclaim. Beyond that, a European Restatement 
should also contain a chapter on the conflict of laws problems in con­
necting together different layers of European, national and international 
law. This might even contain a kind of inventory of national provisions 
incompatible with EC law or to be interpreted in a particular way which 
conforms with European law. In respect of its legal validity, such a Re­
statement would of course be non-binding on the whole, but constituted 
by many parts of international or EC law which are binding. This might 
render it more appealing for courts and practitioners — for experience 
shows that they are hardly interested in academic exercises, but rather in 
existing law.
A European Restatement could, as with its American counterparts, 
first of all be used as a “secondary” source of law in legal practice. It 
could provide courts with a common and uniform European tool for in­
terpretation, gap-filling and the concrétisation of general clauses in EC 
and national law. In legal science and education, a Restatement pro­
duced by outstanding scholars and practitioners from various European 
States would promote a genuine European legal style, reasoning and 
mode of presentation, and could thus contribute to the overdue “Europe­
anisation of European Legal Science”. After a long period of continuous 
up-dating, refinement and integration of new pieces of EC and interna­
tional legislation, European lawyers and politicians might perhaps reach 
the insight that the area occupied by the binding international and EC 




























































































lutions” for gaps derived from the ius commune compilations convinc­
ing and, last but not least, the daily problem of serving two masters 
when dealing with the multi-level regime and the conflicts, fragmenta­
tions and inconsistencies arising therein too cumbersome. Then, the time 
might actually be ripe to abandon the earlier reservations and enact the 
mles of the Restatement as a kind of model law, as in a European Uni­
form Commercial Code, in order to regain a more coherent vision of the 
law. Yet even before this could happen, and even if it were not to hap­
pen at all, the above-mentioned advantages of a Restatement would be 
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